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Georgia’s Redevelopment Powers Law: 





Introduction   
 Within the past five years, eleven separate tax allocation districts (TADs) have 
been created in the metropolitan Atlanta region.  Currently, policy-makers in the City of 
Atlanta are considering the use of TADs to finance the proposed “Beltline” project.  
While TADs are a powerful tool in a localities’ economic development arsenal, these 
policies are not without cost and not without risk.  The sudden surge in popularity of this 
economic development tool generally has not been accompanied by any systematic 
assessment or set of policies to guide their evaluation or their use.  Thus, this report sets 
out to familiarize local policy makers with: 
 
 How TADs work; 
 The potential benefits of TADs; 
 The potential risks and costs associated with TADs and how these might 
be distributed across different stakeholder groups; and 
 Policies to help minimize costs and risks. 
 
What is a TAD? 
 When a jurisdiction experiences redevelopment or new economic development, 
typically the value of taxable properties in that jurisdiction increases, and thus, the tax 
revenues collected from these properties increase.  Tax allocation districts work by 
capturing the incremental tax revenues gained from this increase in property values in a 
pre-designated geographic area and using these funds to retire debt or to fund 
improvements on a pay-as-you-go basis.   
The most significant financing innovation associated with TADs is the use of 
TAD-backed debt (often referred to as “tax increment financing”).  Specifically, 
jurisdictions can issue debt to fund capital improvements and/or to support other public 
or private sector investments in an area, and use the anticipated increase in property 
values from this investment to finance the debt.  Recently, Georgia expanded this law to 
allow localities to commit incremental gains in sales taxes and other taxes such as the 
hotel-motel taxes to support TAD activities.  In most cases, the incremental revenues 
involved include those of all the tax jurisdictions that overlap with the TAD – cities, 
counties, schools, and special districts.  Under Georgia State Law, these jurisdictions 
must agree to commit their incremental revenues to the TAD.   
 
Benefits of TADs 
 The expectation when using TADs is that the revenues they produce will finance 
projects that stimulate growth and thus contribute to growth in jobs, wealth, housing 
opportunities and other economic development goals, while also enhancing the fiscal 
position of participating jurisdictions.  Planners can point to a number of TAD-financed 
projects around the country that produced significant returns on investment.  However, 
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the benefits of TADs come not only from its potential to stimulate growth but from its 
flexibility as a financing and redevelopment tool.  These benefits include:  
 
• The ability to finance economic development activities based on anticipated 
increases in revenues, rather than drawing on the current tax base; 
• The ability to issue TAD debt, which does not count against state-imposed 
local debt ceilings and does not have to be backed by the full faith and credit 
of the issuing jurisdiction; 
• Access to a policy tool that allows overlapping jurisdictions to pool resources 
(from incremental increases in property tax revenues) to support economic 
development activities; and 
• Access to redevelopment powers, such as eminent domain. 
 
Costs and Risks of TADs 
 While TADs appear to have been highly successful in certain regions around the 
country, TADs do represent a financial gamble on the part of local governments.  The 
increased growth from a TAD investment needs not only to cover the upfront costs of the 
local investment in a particular project but also any related increases in public service 
costs.   
 
The use of TADs can potentially reduce the net wealth of jurisdictions in three key ways:   
 
• Jurisdictions may use anticipated TAD revenues to finance projects whose 
benefits do not materialize sufficiently to cover the costs of the debt issued or 
other public sector investments;  
o Further, TAD debt is expensive because it is considered to be high risk 
by bond markets; and  
o While jurisdictions may not explicitly back this debt, bond rating 
agencies (if not the bond market) may penalize a locality for a default.   
• TAD investments may stimulate growth that increases demand for public 
services but may not generate sufficient new revenues to meet this demand.  
This problem may be particularly acute for school districts. 
• Localities may use TAD resources to give benefits to businesses that would 
have made the necessary improvements or investments without public support 
(or might have made the same investment in another part of the jurisdiction 
outside the TAD); in other words, jurisdictions are giving out public money to 
a business that could have been better invested elsewhere. 
 
TADs may also come with social equity issues that have been associated with 
previous redevelopment policies.  For instance, TADs may explicitly or inadvertently 
force low to moderate income families out of neighborhoods as new investment and 
redevelopment occurs.   
 
Capitalizing on the Benefits; Hedging Against the Risks of TADs  
Because these costs and risks are non-trivial, most states and localities have 
adopted strategies to try to ensure the careful use of tax allocation districts.  Georgia 
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localities should have a particular incentive to deploy this policy tool carefully because a 
jurisdiction can only commit 10 percent of its property tax base to TADs at any given 
point in time.  Further, TADs, which rely on increases in the value of property, may 
conflict with other public policy objectives such as property tax relief or tax abatements 
for targeted businesses.  Thus, key recommendations from this report include the 
following:  
 
1. To husband the use of TADs and to avoid conflicting policy priorities, 
localities should develop TADs as part of an overall planning and economic 
development strategy.  In particular, a locality should identify the areas that 
should be targeted for redevelopment, the critical public purposes that will be 
served by TAD, and the types of projects that are appropriate for TAD 
backing.   
 
At the project level, jurisdictions need to make sure that the proposed TAD-
financed projects will produce the returns needed to cover at least the initial investment 
and the increase in public service demands from the project.  
 
2. Localities should conduct a full and careful feasibility, fiscal impact, and cost-
benefit analysis of proposed TAD projects. Localities should be conservative 
in estimating revenues from TADs that can be used for backing debt. 
 
In dealing with the private sector, a classic problem with economic development 
subsidies is that local governments sometimes do not bargain shrewdly with their private 
sector counterparts.   
 
3. In general, jurisdictions should develop policies to target TADs for projects 
where private sector investment is unlikely without public sector investment.  
Some of the most successful uses of TADs have been in brownfield 
redevelopment, redevelopment of areas with significant levels of urban blight, 
and reuse of old industrial or military facilities.   
 
By carefully picking key areas to target, TADs are also less likely to raise 
concerns about inequitable treatment of communities included in the district – 
and instead may be of substantial benefit to them.   
 
Other recommendations to try to minimize taxpayer risk include: 
 
4. Minimize direct government subsidy in favor of strategies that share risk with 
the private sector.  Examples of these strategies include reimbursement of 
private sector entities for environmental clean-up or providing gap financing.   
 
5. Develop annual performance audits or evaluations, as well as financial audits, 
to determine private sector progress towards agreed up goals and to show how 
public funds are being used to support TAD redevelopment plans.  
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6. Clearly specify the benefits to be produced by the private sector entity 
receiving TAD assistance and include meaningful sanctions for failure to meet 
goals. 
 
Finally, TAD debt needs to be assessed in conjunction with the initial review of 
the project(s) being considered.  Localities should be conservative in their assessment and 
use of TAD-backed debt.  The worst case scenario is that a locality issues a large amount 
of debt for benefits that never materialize and is implicitly or explicitly held liable for the 
debt by the bond rating agencies or bondholders.  In effect, the taxpayers are left holding 
the bag.   
 
Conclusion 
 Tax allocation districts and the financing instruments associated with them have 
become mainstream economic development tools in many states.  Georgia is just 
beginning to experiment more broadly with this strategy.  As it does so, localities in the 
state can benefit from the experiences, both positive and negative, with this financing 
instrument.  This report is an effort to assimilate many of the lessons learned from across 
the country and provide an initial framework for Georgia localities to consider as they 
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GEORGIA’S REDEVELOPMENT POWERS LAW: 




A tax allocation district (TAD) is an important and potentially powerful tool in a 
municipality’s economic redevelopment arsenal.  Many municipalities across the country 
report significant positive outcomes from the implementation of a TAD.  However, there 
exist numerous examples of less than positive outcomes as well.  The principal purpose 
of this report is to assist policy makers in their assessment and implementation of tax 
allocation districts so that TADs are successful.   
 
The report thus sets out to familiarize local policy makers with: 
 
 How TADs work; 
 The potential benefits of TADs; 
 The potential risks and costs associated with TADs and how these might be 
distributed across different stakeholder groups; and 
 Strategies to help minimize many of these costs and risks. 
 
Drawing on examples from Atlanta and elsewhere, this report discusses and suggests 
economic development policies, with the ultimate objective of helping local policy-
makers sort through some of the concerns and issues that use of TADs raise.  The 
discussion of costs and risks should provide ideas about ways to evaluate and structure 
TADs more effectively in order to promote the redevelopment of blighted or underused 
areas while protecting the fiscal health of local jurisdictions.  
 
Within the past five years, eleven separate tax allocation districts have been created in 
metropolitan Atlanta, nine of which were initiated within the past two years.  For the 
most part, this sudden surge in popularity of TADs has not been accompanied by formal 
or consistent policies to guide their evaluation or use, even though any given jurisdiction 
may create only a limited number of TADs under current state law.  The Atlanta region is 
not alone in wrestling with ways to guide and structure the use of this particular policy 
instrument.  Forty-eight of the 50 states allow localities to use some form of tax 
increment financing for economic development purposes (Johnson and Kriz 2001); in 
almost every state there is an on-going debate about how TIF should be used. 
 
TADs represent a particular financial trade off where local governments commit a portion 
of the anticipated growth in municipal revenues to an investment in economic 
development related activities rather than to providing general services; in return, these 
jurisdictions expect that their investment will generate new growth and that the long term 
revenues generated by this new economic development will cover and exceed the costs of 
their investment, as well as any related increases in public service costs.   
 
Research on TADs has shown them to be beneficial in certain circumstances, and this 
report describes several TAD projects that appear to have stimulated new growth and 
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development.  At the same time, local decision-makers should be aware that TADs are 
not costless and not without risk.  As with any economic development financial tool, 
local governments can end up giving the private sector unmerited and unneeded benefits.  
TADs may also require use of risky investment tools, may create equity concerns, and 
may become costly to taxpayers if the new development prompted by a TAD does not 
produce the anticipated tax growth or creates unfunded public service demands. 
 
The report lays out issues that should be considered in deciding which projects should 
receive TAD financing.  Decisions about TADs (and the use of any economic 
development incentive for that matter) are as much about what not to do, or what to 
avoid, as they are about what to do.    Therefore, a major focus of this report is on ways to 
deal with potential problems that could emerge from a TIF project.  While there is no 
magic formula to determine what is a good TAD project, policy-makers can conduct 
careful analyses of projects that will help make more informed decisions. This report 
attempts to explain what steps should be taken and what factors should be considered in 
making such a decision to hone TIF into a more cost-effective financing and policy tool.  
 
Chapter 1 describes TAD mechanics and covers the procedures for implementing a TAD 
in Georgia.  Chapter 2 describes the benefits and costs of TADs generally, while Chapter 
3 deals more specifically with the issues of cost and risk in issuing debt based on 
incremental revenues.  These latter chapters also discuss different strategies that might be 
adopted to avoid or hedge against these risks and costs.  Chapter 4 discusses the 
Redevelopment Powers Act and policy issues that might need to be addressed the State 
level with respect to TADs (the other Chapters presume that the law is fixed as it is).  
Finally, the Appendix includes case studies of the current TADs in the Atlanta 
metropolitan area. 
 
What are Tax Allocation Districts? 
Tax allocation district financing works by capturing the incremental tax revenues gained 
from new private development within a specific geographic area.  These funds are then 
pledged to either the retirement of debt issued by a sponsoring city, county, or 
redevelopment agency or to funding improvements on a pay-as-you-go basis.  The 
improvements, in turn, are planned to attract, or in many cases, provide direct support to  
new private development.  Usually, the incremental taxes involve only property taxes, but 
some states, including Georgia, also allow local sales taxes and other taxes (e.g., hotel-
motel taxes, business license receipts, etc.) that are generated by new development to be 
committed to the repayment of redevelopment expenses.  In most cases, the incremental 
tax revenues involved include those of all taxing jurisdictions that overlap the TIF district 
– cities, counties, and variety of special districts, including (importantly) school districts, 
which typically levy and collect the largest portion of local taxes.  
 
 
A Brief History of TIF 
 
Use of tax increment financing is now over 50 years old, having first been introduced in 
California in 1952 to provide localities with matching funds for the federal Urban 
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Renewal grant program.  Numerous other states followed suit with various forms of TIF 
legislation.  The greatest period of growth occurred in the 1970s and 1980s as local 
appetite for community renewal began to outstrip the federal government’s capacity and 
willingness to provide grant funds (Klacik and Nunn 2001).   
 
In many cities, TIF has been used to promote public-private redevelopment projects on 
large tracts of land no longer needed for their original purposes.  In the 1950s and 1960s, 
abandoned rail yards located in the core areas of cities were a focal point for 
redevelopment activity.  More recently, cities have turned their attention to recycling old 
wharves, pier heads, and shipyards.  In the 1990s, TIF was applied to military base 
conversions, and new public-private partnerships have emerged for redevelopment of 
“brownfield” sites located where abandoned factories and steel mills once operated. 
 
While 48 states and the District of Columbia authorize the use of TIF, there is substantial 
variation in its actual use by local governments.  California, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and 
Illinois have made extensive use of TIF while states such as Hawaii, Mississippi, and 
New Jersey have few to no operating TIF districts.  Different states have also 
experimented with different rules and regulations governing the use and structure of TIF 
financing (Johnson and Kriz 2001; Johnson 2002).   
 
Localities in Georgia have not made extensive use of TIF financing until recently.  While 
Georgia adopted its TIF statute, the Redevelopment Powers Law, in 1985, the state did 
not have its first TIF district until 1992 and did not see its first TAD bonds issued until 
2001.  Recent legislation amending the Redevelopment Powers Law in 2004 gave 
localities increased flexibility by permitting use of sales tax increments in a district, as 
well as the use of all property taxes collected in a TAD to make debt payments in the 
event tax increments are insufficient.   
  
The Vision:  TIF Projects That Worked 
 
While there have been few systematic evaluations of TIF projects, the following cases 
describe projects outside Georgia that appear to have been successful in rehabilitating 
previously blighted or difficult to develop areas.  In the Appendices we have included 
descriptions of all the TADs that have been adopted in the Atlanta metropolitan area and 




San Diego: Horton Plaza and Petco Park 
 
San Diego has been pursuing downtown redevelopment for several decades.  The city of 
San Diego has a FY 2005 redevelopment budget of $333,241,000.  Current year tax 
increment revenue is $72,777,000 of which $43,536,000 is required for debt service.  
There are 20 current redevelopment projects.  Redevelopment plans are generated and 
adopted within the framework of the city’s General Plan and its community plans.  
Where allowed by redevelopment law, redevelopment powers, importantly TIF and 
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eminent domain, may be used to implement community plans.  Use of these powers 
requires, among other things, a finding of blight and provision of affordable housing. 
30% of agency built and 15% of private new and rehabilitated housing must be affordable 
to low- and moderate-income households, and 20% of tax increments collected must be 
spent on low-and moderate income housing (Centre City Development Corporation 
2004).  
 
Among the numerous San Diego projects are two very interesting downtown TADs: 
Horton Plaza and Petco Park.  Both these projects were initiated by private interests, but 
“fit” the city’s general plan and redevelopment objectives. 
Horton Plaza.  San Diego’s first successful TIF project was Horton Plaza.  This project 
was structured very much like a classic urban renewal project.  The City paid for land 
assembly and supporting public infrastructure.  Private redevelopment followed.  The 
difference is that the city’s share came from increases in local property tax resulting from 
the new private development, not a federal grant.  
Planning for Horton Plaza in San Diego began more than 20 years ago.  It was in a part of 
downtown San Diego that had become notorious for its strip clubs and X-rated movie 
theaters.  $40 million of the $160 million project cost came from public sources.  The 
city's redevelopment agency acquired 11.5 acres of downtown land for about $25 million 
and wrote-down the price to the developer to $1 million. The city also paid roughly $15 
million more for public improvements, including wider streets and sidewalks, water and 
sewer lines, and other items.  Within a year of the 1985 opening, there was an additional 
$368 million in private investment downtown.  Horton Plaza generated enough property 
tax increment revenue in the first eight years to repay the initial public investment.  In 17 
years, the Horton Plaza Redevelopment Project has increased assessed property values by 
$451 million (Callies and Gruth 2002; Eddy 1995; The Jerde Partnership 2004). 
 
Petco Park.  Petco Park is the new San Diego Padres baseball stadium.  The City of San 
Diego, the city’s redevelopment agency Centre City Development Corporation (CCDC), 
and the Padres entered into a “memorandum of understanding” in 1998 for construction 
of the new ballpark and redevelopment of the surrounding East Village area.  East 
Village was a blighted area that had already been qualified for redevelopment.  The city 
agreed to participate in financing a new ballpark for the Padres; it put about $300 million, 
$169 million in bond sale proceeds, into the $454 million stadium.  In return, the city 
required the team owner to invest in the ballpark district, a part of the East Village area 
adjacent to the stadium.  This investment creates the tax increments through real estate 
and hotel/motel taxes needed to secure the tax increment bond funding.  The team 
owner’s real estate development firm, JMI Realty, became the master developer, either 
building or engaging others to develop $593 million of hotel, residential, retail, and 
parking structures.  The minimum value of new development needed to produce a 
sufficient increment was about $300 million, so the new JMI development is about twice 
what was needed.  Additionally, other “unconnected” developers have launched 32 new 
housing developments that range from lofts to apartments for the elderly.  The entire East 
Village is now redeveloping (Gross 2004; Heller 2002). 
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Roseville, Minnesota:  Brownfield Clean-up 
 
The State of Minnesota has explicitly authorized TIF use for two types of environmental 
clean-up districts:  localities may create either a “soils condition district” or a “hazardous 
substance districts” depending on the nature of the environmental damage to the site.  
Prior to declaring such districts a locality must certify that the cost of the environmental 
clean up is greater than the fair market value of the land.   
 
A hazardous substance district comes with some particularly unique features.  
Specifically, the locality may actually write down the base assessed value of the land and 
also may expand the district to include lands adjacent to the contaminated properties 
thereby increasing the “increment” available for remediation purpose.   
 
In Roseville, the city had entered into a TIF agreement with a developer for 
redevelopment purposes only.  The project initially entailed simply tearing down some 
existing structures and constructing new ones for industrial and commercial uses.  
However, as the developer proceeded with the project he found that creosote, solvents, 
and other chemicals contaminated the site.  Clean up costs were estimated at $2.7 million.   
 
The city then proceeded to declare the site a hazardous substance district and wrote down 
the value of the property to zero.  This policy shift gave the city an additional tax 
increment of $1.5 million towards the cleanup.  The city assisted with the remainder of 
the costs by renegotiating the development agreement to allow the developer to use the 
land more intensively and increasing the minimum market value of the improvements. 
With the financing the developer cleaned up the land and built the improvements that the 
city had proposed.  The site then received a certificate from the state that environmental 
remediation had been completed to the state’s satisfaction. 
 
In several case study reviews of similar situations in Minnesota, researchers have found 
that while the tax increment is often not sufficient to cover the costs of the entire clean-
up, it is important in building partnerships with the private sector to complete 
environmental remediation (Zackman and Steinwell 2001).   
 
Circle Centre Mall, Indianapolis 
 
In 1988 and 1992, Indianapolis issued a combined total of $293.5 million in TIF bonds to 
help revitalize its ailing downtown.  $265 million of these bonds was spent on assisting 
with the development of the Circle Centre Mall.  The city was responsible for land 
acquisition, improving infrastructure around the site, constructing parking garages, 
developing the core and shell of the mall building and preserving historic building 
facades.  Initially the project bogged down in several lawsuits and had to be scaled back 
from a $1 billion project to a $500-$700 million project.  In 1991 twenty Indianapolis 
companies agreed to assist with a $50 million investment in the project and the project 
received a $72.5 million loan from a group of banks.  The project was completed in 1995 
and on the opening day 60,000 people visited the mall.  Between 1995 and 2000, the 
economic return to the city from the project was estimated at $2.1 billion (Johnson 2002).  
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Chapter 1: The Mechanics of TIF 
 
A Primer on How TIF Works 
 
A number of terms are essential to an understanding of TIF and TIF calculations.  In 
districts where only property tax revenues1 are used, they are as follows: 
 
• Base Year – the year (usually at that point in the year when tax assessments are 
determined) that the TIF district is established. 
• Base Assessed Value – the assessed value of property within the TIF district in the 
base year (net of any and all exemptions). 
• Incremental Assessed Value – the assessed value in the TIF district in any year 
after the base year (net of exemptions) minus the base assessed value. 
• Incremental Tax Revenue – the incremental assessed value multiplied by the 
overall tax rate applicable to TIF district properties. 
• Initiating Jurisdiction – the local government entity that creates and activates the 
TIF district and usually (but not always) issues TIF bonds. 
• Participating Jurisdiction – the taxing jurisdictions whose assessed value is at 
least partially contained within a TIF district, including the initiating jurisdiction, 
and whose incremental tax revenue is applied to TIF projects. (Klacik and Nunn 
2001). 
 
Before a TIF district or TAD is established, the initiating jurisdiction and all participating 
jurisdictions derive individual tax revenues from property in the district based on their 
respective tax rates and allowable exemptions (e.g., various homestead exemptions).  
After establishment of a TAD, property tax revenues generated by the base assessed 
value continue to go to each individual jurisdiction, but the incremental tax revenues flow 
solely to the initiating jurisdiction for financing TAD activities.  Table 1 shows a simple 
example of the allocation of base year and incremental tax revenues for a hypothetical 5-
year TIF plan covering four jurisdictions. 
 
The example shows a 5-year TIF period.  Typically, TIF revenues would be captured for 
the length of any TIF bonds issued – often 25 to 30 years.  Also, notice that the 
“incremental tax revenues” available depend on both the assessed value and the tax rate.  
Any policy, business-cycle, or economic change that affect either the assessed value or 
tax rate will also impact the TIF revenues collected.  Thus, a financial commitment 
based on projected increases in property tax revenues has both financial risk 
associated with the economy at large and has policy implications that relate to 
keeping the assessed value and tax rates consistent across time.  For instance, under 
Georgia State law, once a TAD is created, no participating jurisdictions can cut tax rates 
in that district.   
 
                                                 
1 While Georgia recently made the sales tax available to support TIF, this report will primarily focus on property tax 






Tax Rate  $   1,000,000  $     1,100,000  $     1,200,000  $     1,500,000  $     2,000,000  $     3,000,000  $          5,000,000 
per $1,000 Base Year Base Year +1 Base Year +2 Base Year +3 Base Year +4 Base Year +5 Base Year +6
Jurisdiction AV
     Initiating Jurisdiction $10.50 10,500$        11,550$          12,600$          15,750$          21,000$          31,500$          52,500$               
     Participating Jurisdiction 1   9.00 9,000            9,900              10,800            13,500            18,000            27,000            45,000                 
     Participating Jurisdiction 2 21.25 21,250          23,375            25,500            31,875            42,500            63,750            106,250               
     Participating Jurisdiction 3   5.00 5,000            5,500            6,000            7,500            10,000          15,000            25,000                
          Total TIF district tax rate $46.75
Tax Revenues
     Base year revenues 45,750$        45,750$          45,750$          45,750$          45,750$          45,750$          137,250$             
     Incremental tax revenues -              4,575            9,150            22,875          45,750          91,500            -                     
          Total 45,750$        50,325$          54,900$          68,625$          91,500$          137,250$        137,250$             
Tax Revenue Allocation
     Share to TIF district 0.0% 9.1% 16.7% 33.3% 50.0% 66.7% 0.0%
     Share to initiating and 100.0% 90.9% 83.3% 66.7% 50.0% 33.3% 100.0%
       participating jurisdictions
Notes:
1.  The example shows a five-year TIF period, although the TIF period typically would correspond to the length of any TIF bonds issued (e.g., 20-25 years)
2.  The example applies only to real property, although in some states (e.g., Georgia) personal property would also be included in the calculations.
Table 1






A Generic Process for Planning and Implementing TIF 
 
The generic process for planning and implementing TIF involves five broad steps: 1) 
initiation; 2) formulation; 3) adoption; 4) implementation; and 5) evaluation and 
termination (Johnson 2002).  The Georgia Redevelopment Powers Act gives localities 
much discretion for the evaluation of a proposed TAD and the structuring of the 
partnerships and financial agreements necessary for implementation. 
 
Initiation:  Project initiation begins with ascertaining whether a project is sufficiently 
needed and financially feasible, making the more involved process of project formulation 
worthwhile.  While straightforward in principle, this step can be tricky in application.  
One of the most important determinations is whether there are private participants who 
are interested and willing to participate in the proposed project.  Eligibility of the area 
under state law must also be examined as should the initial estimates of economic 
benefits and costs.     
 
Formulation:  Project formulation includes numerous components that are mandated 
under state law.  In almost all states, including Georgia, a jurisdiction initiating a TAD 
must create a “redevelopment plan”.  This plan includes a formal analysis of the 
components assessed in the “initiation” stage.  Georgia’s requirements are described in 
detail later in this chapter.  Broadly, key components include: 
 
• Dimensions of the TAD, including geographic boundaries, value of property, and 
anticipated revenues; 
• A finding of blight; 
• An assessment of whether development would occur without public assistance 
(colloquially called a “but for” finding); 
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• A formal evaluation of project costs; 
• Specification of financing;  
• Details of necessary agreements with overlapping jurisdictions and private parties. 
 
Adoption:  While the plan is still in its draft stages, in Georgia, the initiating jurisdiction 
must also solicit consent resolutions from overlapping jurisdictions to include their 
portion of the tax increment in any financing arrangements.  During the adoption stage, 
the initiating jurisdiction will also hold public hearings and develop any draft ordinances 
and contracts necessary to implement the agreements detailed in the redevelopment plan.  
 
Implementation:  Implementation involves certifying the base assessed value of the 
TAD, initiating the collection of incremental tax revenues, issuing debt or otherwise 
managing project finances, initiating and managing the capital improvements process 
(i.e., construction, environmental remediation, etc., if applicable), and managing 
contracts with private parties and other participating entities.  
 
Evaluation and Termination:  This final part of the process includes evaluating the 
efficacy of the TAD and ending the collection of the incremental tax revenues.  
 
The following section describes how this process is applied under Georgia’s 
Redevelopment Powers Law. 
 
Applying the TAD Process in Georgia 
 
Overview of the Georgia Redevelopment Powers Law 
In 1985, the General Assembly enacted the Redevelopment Powers Law (GA Code 
Annotated 36-44-1, et seq., the “Law”).  This law is intended to give localities new tools 
to form public/private partnerships to redevelop areas that “contribute to or cause 
unemployment, limit the tax resources of counties and municipalities while creating a 
greater demand for governmental services and, in general, have a deleterious effect upon 
the public health, safety, morals, and welfare”.  The Law which spells out how TADs 
should be created and implemented has been amended several times to give localities 
more flexibility in the types of funds that can be used in TADs and in the types of 
projects and areas that are eligible. 
 
Pre-Initiation: Obtaining Authority to Implement TAD 
In Georgia, prior to even initiating its first TAD project, a local government must receive 
authorization from the State General Assembly to exercise powers under the Law.  Once 
enacted, the local act must be approved by a majority of registered voters in the initiating 
jurisdiction in a special election held for that purpose.  After voter approval, a local 
jurisdiction may proceed to initiate tax allocation districts (§36-44-22 O.C.G.A.).  
Georgia also has several other “global” limitations on the use of TADs:   
 
• Localities cannot create a TAD if the total current taxable value of property within the 
proposed TAD plus the total current taxable value of property within all its existing 
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TADs exceeds 10 percent of the total current taxable value of all taxable property 
located within the initiating jurisdiction’s area of operation (§36-44-17 O.C.G.A.).  
 
• All overlapping jurisdictions whose tax increment is captured by a TAD (or 
“participating jurisdictions”) must pass consent resolutions agreeing to participate in 
the TAD.  Otherwise their tax increment cannot be captured by the initiating 
jurisdiction for redevelopment purposes (§36-44-9 O.C.G.A.).   
 
Delegation to Redevelopment Agency: 
The Law allows an initiating jurisdiction to delegate many of its redevelopment powers 
to a “redevelopment agency”.  An initiating jurisdiction may create a public corporation 
to carry out such powers or designate a local housing authority or a downtown 
development authority (so long as the TAD lies within the authority’s area of operation) 
to do so.  Delegation cannot include certain powers, which must remain with the 
initiating jurisdiction:   
 
• Adoption of the required redevelopment plan; 
• Creation of TADs and the establishment of TAD boundaries; 
• Issuance of tax allocation bonds; and 
• Exercise of eminent domain within a TAD (§36-44-6(b) O.C.G.A.) except where a 
downtown development authority is serving as a redevelopment agency (§36-44-
96(c) O.C.G.A.).   
 
Initiation:   
Once a jurisdiction has received authorization from the State and voter approval, it may 
initiate a TAD.  TADs typically take one of two paths, either a developer proposes a 
specific project and goes to a locality for financing assistance in developing this project, 
or alternatively, a locality may identify a particular project or area for redevelopment that 
is likely to benefit from TIF assistance.  
 
In either case a locality should assess the plan to ensure it meets some basic criteria.  
These criteria will in part have to be formally evaluated and certified in the project 
formulation process.   
 
• Financial feasibility:  TIF relies on appreciation in the value of property.  Thus any 
evaluation should examine the probability that a proposed project or redevelopment 
plan will lead to increases in the value of the property in the proposed TAD.  In some 
cases, local governments have made an infrastructure investment using TIF bonds and 
the anticipated development has failed to materialize.  The local government is then 
forced to choose between letting the debt default and drawing on general fund 
revenues to bail out the TIF backed debt.2  For reasons that will be discussed in 
Chapter 3, much pressure may be brought to bear on local government to bail out TIF 
backed debt. 
                                                 
2 For instance, one researcher found that districts in Florida and Michigan did not generate sufficient 
revenues to cover debt obligations (McKaig 2002). 
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Fundamentally, a project is more likely to be financially viable if there is significant 
private sector interest and engagement in the project, as opposed to an “if you build it 
they will come” mentality on the part of local government.  In structuring the TAD 
arrangements, local governments may be able to transfer some of the risk of 
insufficient appreciation in incremental taxes to the private sector.  The question early 
in the process is whether the private sector interests are willing to bear some of the 
risk associated with TIF. 
 
• Eligibility for TIF:  Local governments should determine that the proposed project or 
plan is eligible for TIF assistance under Georgia Law.  A TAD can be used for 
“redevelopment purposes” in a “redevelopment area” for “redevelopment costs”.  
Each redevelopment activity is broadly defined in Georgia State law (for exact 
definitions see §36-44-3 O.C.G.A.).  Amendments passed in 2001 expanded the 
definition of a “redevelopment area,” enabling communities to undertake 
redevelopment activities in areas other than those that met the traditional 
characteristics of “slum and blight.”  In effect, it gave suburban jurisdictions 
throughout the state access to the provisions of the Law.   
 
A locality must certify the eligibility of a redevelopment area for TAD in its 
redevelopment plan (§36-44-3(9)(B) and 36-44-3(G)(i) O.C.G.A.).  This certification 
requires the locality to attest that growth or development would not have occurred 
without a TAD or certain natural assets would not be preserved or protected without 
the TAD.  
 
• Assessing the Costs and Benefits of TIF:  There is no state provision mandating that a 
locality assess the potential costs and benefits to themselves and their taxpayers at 
any point in the process.  But, it is in a locality’s best interests to do so, if for no other 
reason than to avoid failure of the project.  The issues that an initiating jurisdiction 
should consider when evaluating costs, risks, and benefits of TIF are discussed in 
detail in Chapters 2 and 3.   
 
Formulation:    
The next step in creating a TAD is the preparation of a redevelopment plan for the 
proposed district.  The redevelopment plan must contain several elements conform to the 
Law’s requirements.  Specifically, it must: 
 
1. Specify the boundaries of the tax allocation district; 
2. Include a finding that the redevelopment area has not been subject to growth and 
development and would not reasonably be anticipated to be developed without the 
approval of the redevelopment plan; 
3. Explain the proposed uses of real property within the redevelopment area after 
redevelopment has occurred; 
4. Describe the redevelopment projects to be undertaken under the plan, along with 
estimates of their cost and method of funding; 
5. Describe any multi-year contracts or other agreements that would obligate the initiating 
jurisdiction in the plan’s implementation; 
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6. Describe any relocation payments proposed to be authorized by the redevelopment plan;  
7. Include a statement that the proposed redevelopment plan conforms with the local 
comprehensive plan, master plan, zoning ordinance, and building codes of the initiating 
jurisdiction or explain any exceptions; 
8. Include estimates of redevelopment costs to be incurred during the course of 
implementing the redevelopment plan; 
9. Recite the last known assessed valuation of property within the redevelopment area and 
the estimated assessed valuation after redevelopment; 
10. Provide adequate protections from substantial alteration and/or demolition to historic 
property within the redevelopment area that is to be redeveloped under the plan; 
11. Specify the proposed effective date for the creation of the tax allocation district and the 
proposed termination date; 
12. Contain a map specifying the boundaries of the proposed tax allocation district and 
showing existing uses and conditions of real property within the TAD; 
13. Specify the estimated base assessed value of property within the proposed TAD; 
14. Specify which participating jurisdictions’ property taxes are to be included in the 
calculation of incremental tax revenues of the TAD (supported by the required consent 
resolutions from such jurisdictions); 
15. Indicate the amount of any proposed TAD bond issue or issues and the term(s) and 
assumed rate(s) of interest applicable to them; 
16. Provide estimates of the amounts of incremental tax revenues that will are to be available 
to pay TAD bond principal and interest over their proposed term(s); and 
17. It must also specify any other property to be pledged as security for payment of any 
proposed TAD bonds.  (§36-44-3 O.C.G.A.) 
 
Adoption:   
Once the redevelopment plan has been prepared and formally submitted to the legislative 
body of an initiating jurisdiction, at least one public hearing on the plan must be held 
within 60 days (§36-44-7(b) O.C.G.A.).  The proposed plan (as submitted or amended) 
must be approved or rejected within 45 days after the public hearing (§36-44-7(c) 
O.C.G.A.).  Until recently, obtaining the consent of overlapping jurisdictions to include 
their tax increments had to be accomplished during the 45 day period, but SB 514, 
enacted by the Georgia General Assembly in 2004, removes this step from the 45 day 
period and simply requires that it be done before the incremental taxes of such 
jurisdictions may be included in the overall tax allocation increment.  
Amendments to any approved redevelopment plan are allowed if preceded by adequate 
public notice (§36-44-7 O.C.G.A.).  However, if an amendment changes the boundaries of 
the TAD the base assessed value for the amended district must be recalculated as of the 
effective date of the boundary change (§36-44-10 O.C.G.A.). 
 
Finally, the Law specifies that the effective date of the creation of any TAD is December 
31st of the year in which the redevelopment plan for the TAD is adopted (§36-44-8(3)(b) 
O.C.G.A.).  It also requires the initiating jurisdiction (or its redevelopment agent) to apply 
to the State Revenue Commissioner for an official determination of the TAD’s base 
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assessed value as of the effective date for purposes of determining future incremental tax 
revenues (§36-44-10 O.C.G.A.).3
 
Implementation:   
The Law provides that all incremental tax revenues generated after the effective date of a 
TAD be allocated to the initiating jurisdiction each year until all redevelopment costs 
and/or TAD bonds have been paid.  All incremental tax revenues are required to be 
placed in a special fund controlled by the initiating jurisdiction and used exclusively to 
pay TAD redevelopment costs, including debt service.    
 
Any lease or contract payments received by an initiating jurisdiction also are required to 
be deposited into the special fund and, as with incremental tax, may be used only to pay 
TAD redevelopment costs or debt service.  After all redevelopment costs and TAD bonds 
have been paid or provided for, any moneys remaining are distributed in proportion to 
their contributions to the initiating and participating jurisdictions. (§36-44-11(c) O.C.G.A) 
 
The Law has several other key provisions that affect debt and the implementation of 
TAD.   
 
• Issuing Debt:  For the sole purpose of paying redevelopment costs, TAD bonds may 
be issued by an initiating jurisdiction.  TAD bonds do not constitute debt within the 
meaning of Article IX, Section V of the Georgia Constitution, and therefore cannot be 
secured by the full faith and credit of the initiating jurisdiction, and do not count 
against the debt limitation placed on cities and counties within the state. TAD bonds 
must mature within 30 years of their issuance, may bear interest at either fixed or 
variable rates without regard to any state usury limits imposed in other sections of the 
Georgia Code, may be subject to early redemption on such terms as the issuer may 
determine, may be refunded through the issuance of additional TAD bonds, and are 
subject to superior court validation, as required of other state and local bonds in 
Georgia. 
 
• Freezing Property Tax Millage Rates:  The Law provides that until a TAD is 
terminated, neither an initiating jurisdiction nor any participating jurisdiction may 
decrease ad valorem tax rates within the TAD below the rate levied when TAD bonds 
were issued.  This provision effectively establishes a “floor” on property tax rates 
applicable to properties within a TAD, removing one significant risk of holding TAD 
bonds.   
 
• Securing TAD Bonds:  Finally, an initiating jurisdiction may secure TAD bonds by 
backing the debt with all its general fund revenues derived from the TAD.  Until this 
year, the Law allowed use of these funds only if incremental tax revenues, together 
with other security pledges, were insufficient in any year to make full debt payments 
(i.e., in the past they could be used only as “back up security,” not as primary 
security).  As of this year, if there is a “finding” by a jurisdiction that positive tax 
                                                 
3 The lack of coordination between initiating jurisdictions and local tax officials has often resulted in this 
very important legal requirement being overlooked. 
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increments and other security in the district will not be sufficient to cover debt 
obligations, general funds may be pledged directly.  In effect, this amendment allows 
an initiating jurisdiction to pledge all property taxes that it (and its county 
government, if the county approves) levies within a TAD, as well as local option sales 
taxes collected within the district, to pay TAD bond debt service. 
 
Evaluation and Termination:   
While some states restrict the length of time that a TAD can exist, in Georgia, a TAD 
may exist until the initiating jurisdiction votes to terminate the designation.  A locality 
may not terminate a TAD until all the redevelopment costs have been paid (§36-44-12 
O.C.G.A.).   
 
No formal evaluation requirements are stipulated in the State law.  Nonetheless, localities 
would benefit from careful regular on-going assessment of whether private sector 
interests are meeting the expectations of benefits expected from public/private 












Given the framework described, tax allocation districts can be a powerful and flexible 
redevelopment tool; however, they should be carefully deployed.  In Georgia, localities 
may only commit 10% of their tax base to TADs (§36-44-17), so TAD is a policy tool 
that needs to be husbanded and used only when it is most appropriate.  Also, as with any 
economic development tool, TADs have the potential to become a costly mistake.  This 
Chapter focuses on an analysis to help policy-makers sort through some of the potential 
problems they might confront in the use of TIF. 
 
Several evaluations of TIF districts have shown that TIF investments can stimulate 
increases in property values in the district in amounts greater than the costs to local 
government (Beckett-Camarata 2001; Cox, Mundell, and Johnson 2001).  Other studies 
have found that TIF appears to increase property values in the jurisdiction overall (Man 
2001; Man and Rosentraub 1998).  In contrast, other evaluations found that TIF simply 
shifts development from one part of a jurisdiction to another (Haulk and Montarti 2001) 
and are unlikely to produce net benefits because the costs of the investment plus increases 
in service demand will swamp the incremental increases in revenues (Kriz 2003).  As a 
result, the research is still judged to be inconclusive on the net benefits of TIF (Man 
2001).  A probable reason for these varying results is that TIFs can be structured very 
differently from one jurisdiction to another or even one project to the next. Therefore, it 
is hard to reach any generalizable conclusions 
 
The expectation when using TIF is that it will stimulate growth that would not otherwise 
occur and thus contribute to growth in jobs, wealth, housing opportunities, and other 
economic development goals while also enhancing the fiscal position of the jurisdiction. 
Ideally, TIF investments reduce public service costs by cleaning up blighted areas that 
attract crime and lead to further deterioration of a neighborhood.  Atlanta’s own 
experience with the Atlantic Steel TAD illustrates a project that likely would not have 
occurred without some public sector financial investments.  The project involved 
important environmental remediation, brought in new businesses and housing, closed a 
gap in the urban fabric, and is expected to stimulate growth in surrounding areas (see 
Appendix).   
 
Despite being popularly portrayed as an almost costless proposition to local governments 
(Pendered 2004; DeSue 2004), TADs do come with both risks and costs. They can 
undermine the fiscal position of a jurisdiction as well as create considerable concerns 
about equity.  While successful TADs can create wealth for a jurisdiction, poorly 
implemented or simply unsuccessful TADs can have the opposite effect.  Specifically,  
TADs have the potential to reduce the net wealth of a jurisdiction in three key ways:  1) 
by giving development benefits to businesses that either would have made the needed 
investments without public support and/or are simply moving from one part of the 
jurisdiction to another, 2) by stimulating growth that creates increased service demands 
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without generating sufficient revenues to cover these services, and 3) through problems 
in the application and development of a TAD, which may leave local governments stuck 
with debt for economic development projects that do not fully materialize. 
 
TADs may also create equity “costs” that were associated with many previous 
redevelopment policies.  For instance, the Redevelopment Powers Act not only provides 
for use of tax increment financing in tax allocation districts, but also enables use of 
eminent domain for redevelopment purposes in these districts.  One issue raised by TADs 
is whether they can be used to change the character of a neighborhood (e.g. 
“gentrification”) through a combination of eminent domain and appreciating housing 
values.  TADs might explicitly or inadvertently force low to moderate income families 
out of a neighborhood (Reingold 2001).   
 
Addressing the Costs of TADs 
 
Because these costs are potentially non-trivial, states and localities have adopted 
strategies to encourage careful use of tax allocation districts (Johnson 2002).  While even 
the best laid plans can go awry, these policies include both planning approaches to 
attempt to avoid future problems and approaches to structuring the TIF to hedge against 
over-commitment of a local tax base or private sector abuse of the program.   
 
Integrated Planning Requirements: 
Placing TAD in an Overall Economic Development Strategy 
 
One strategy for promoting the careful deployment of TADs is to consider its use in an 
overall framework of economic development goals and fiscal and planning policies.  
Planning is important both to ensure the best use of TIF, and to evaluate whether a TIF  
conflicts with other economic development policies.  For instance, because TIF is 
dependent on a stable property tax, TIF projects may pre-empt efforts to reduce property 
taxes generally or to assist certain business development through tax abatements or 
exemptions. 
 
Also, TIF also is one of dozens of economic development tools that draw on the fiscal 
capacities of a jurisdiction.  While one alone may have only a trivial impact on fiscal 
health, combinations of tax abatements, exemptions, and credits may have a significant 
negative cumulative effect.  Careful planning that considers TIF in an overall framework 
is important to avoid these effects, though it may also reduce a jurisdiction’s ability to 
respond quickly to development opportunities.  
 
 
Addressing TIF in an Overall Framework:  
Some existing practices that require evaluation of TIF in a larger context include:   
 
• Prohibiting TIF until a general plan for the jurisdiction is completed with explicit 
consideration of TIF districts.   
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o Johnson (2002) shows 31 states including Georgia require that TIF redevelopment 
plans conform to the locality’s comprehensive plan.  
 
o The District of Columbia and Nebraska actually require local general plans to 
identify targeted redevelopment areas prior to the development of a TIF district.  
The intent of this requirement is to ensure that projects are developed with public 
participation, foster legitimate public purposes, and contribute to achieving a 
community’s objectives and goals (Nebraska Department of Economic 
Development; D.C. Act 12-354,Tax Increment Financing Act of 1998 1998). 
 
• Requiring an assessment of the strength and weakness of alternative financing 
arrangements, such as community improvement districts, tax abatements, and grants 
through the Community Development Block Grant (Zimmer Real Estate Services and 
Associates 2003) 
 
• Requiring the development of a “Unified Economic Development Budget” where 
taxing bodies should annually report on all tax abatements, exemptions, reductions, 
and redirections, individually and totally, and the amount of revenue not paid.  The 
budget also includes reasons for tax relief, expected outcomes, and progress toward 
outcomes.  While this may seem burdensome, jurisdictions that gather and report this 
kind of information are in a good position to evaluate economic development 
subsidies in terms of total impact on taxes and overall performance (Hinkely et al. 
2000). 
 
• Use a multi-year budget to assess the fiscal impact of economic development policies 
in the “out years.” 
 
Preventing Unneeded TAD Subsidies 
 
One of the classic problems of all economic development policies that benefit a particular 
private sector interest is that public sector subsidies or support may be unnecessary; the 
business would have made the investment anyway but would like a subsidy to enhance its 
profits at the expense of the taxpayer.  The public sector subsidy may also give a 
particular firm an advantage over its competitor.   
 
Ideally a local government would be able to look directly at a private sector company’s 
true “return on investment” (ROI) for a particular project, assess the efficiency of that 
business relative to its competitors, and thereby directly determine whether a public 
subsidy is needed.  Given the difficulties of such an analysis, a rigorous assessment of 
“blight” and a “but for” finding are imperfect but important ways to protect taxpayers.  In 
addition, a local government might want to consider ways to structure public-private 




Finding of “Blight”/Establishment of Public Purpose 
Thirty-three states including Georgia require that localities include a finding of blighted 
conditions in their redevelopment plan for a TAD.  This requirement is a legacy of TIF’s 
beginnings in urban renewal and is now often supplemented with an alternative, less 
stringent requirement to find an area “economically underdeveloped.”  However, there 
are good reasons to maintain or strengthen an emphasis on using TADs in blighted areas 
or in areas that are clearly defined as meeting an important public purpose.   
 
One reason to focus on a finding of blight specifically prior to initiating a TAD is that 
blight suggests areas where promoting economic development might be intrinsically good 
– by enhancing job accessibility for poor persons, for example - even if it shifts business 
from one area of a community to another.  A finding of blight indicates that an area might 
not “spontaneously” redevelop.  Also, one might argue that blighted conditions are a drag 
on the local economy and create high operating costs for local government.  Last, a 
finding of “blight” lays the foundation for any declarations of eminent domain associated 
with projects, and in so far as equity concerns are raised by use of TIF, a finding of blight 
may be important in establishing the legitimacy of its use. 
 
In Georgia, as in many other states, the “blight” requirement has been softened by 
allowing underused areas or areas that could become blighted to qualify as TADs.  One 
state merely requires that buildings in the project area be over 35 years old to make a 
finding of blight (LeRoy and Hinkely 2002).  Using this criterion, the neighborhood 
around Georgia’s Governor’s mansion could be “blighted.”    
 
Addressing the Blight Finding:  
Seven states have attempted to tighten up their “blight requirement” by quantifying their 
blight definition  (Alabama, Arkansas, California, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska and 
South Dakota) (Johnson and Kriz 2001).  Items that can be quantified to establish blight 
might include some combination of the following:   
 
• Unemployment or poverty rates in the identified district area; 
• Number or percentage of buildings that are substandard, vacant and/or require 
clearance or renovation;  
• Number or percentage of parcels that are urban or occupied by buildings (as opposed 
to vacant land); 
• Land and buildings have remained unimproved for certain number of years (it is 40 
years in Nebraska); 
• Growth has been stable or decreasing in past years; 
• In Nebraska, the blight finding also requires a public hearing and requires a 
recommendation from the planning commission that their “blighted and substandard” 
criteria do apply to the area in question.  
 
 
Extensions of the Blight Finding: Other Important Public Purposes 
There are other important policy ends that might be served beyond the amelioration of 
traditional notions of “blight”.  These include environmental remediation and reuse of 
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properties such as military bases or old industrial facilities.  One argument for a looser 
definition of blight is that TIF should be available to make urban redevelopment 
competitive with development in greenfields at the periphery of a metropolitan area. 
 
The point is not so much to cleave to one definition of blight, as it is to clearly articulate 
the public purposes that are to be served (and that would not be served otherwise) by use 
of TIF.  Further, a jurisdiction should consider the implications for “equity” for residents 
who live in and around the TAD.   
 
“But For” Assessments 
Another key test for any economic development subsidy is whether a development would 
have occurred without a subsidy.  If it would have occurred anyway then the local 
government is losing money by giving an unwarranted and unneeded handout to a 
developer or a business.   
 
For example, pressures from increasing travel congestion in Atlanta’s suburban areas are 
creating increasing incentives to redevelop urban downtown districts.  Far from offering 
subsidies, organizations such as the Midtown Alliance have shown that businesses and 
property owners will pay additional taxes through Community Improvement Districts 
(CID) for better planning and zoning and public improvements needed to maintain or 
raise quality in the face of mounting development pressure.  Prior to turning to TIF, local 
officials might want to explore alternative less costly policies that may be equally or 
more effective than TAD in a given situation.  In Midtown, the City of Atlanta is reaping 
the benefits of an improved tax base without providing costly public incentives to 
stimulate private investment.  The question to be raised is whether business would 
develop or grow anyway without (or “but for”) a subsidy.   
 
Most states rely on vague statements of “finding” to establish that development would 
not have occurred “but for” a subsidy.  While the question of need for subsidy has not 
been well developed in the context of TIF, in the context of economic development 
incentives more generally, some scholars have proposed a set of considerations that 




• Have strategies other than subsidies been attempted in the TAD area or in similar 
areas?  To what extent have these alternative strategies been successful in generating 
growth? 
• What are the patterns of growth in the community – i.e. is growth and development 
moving towards the TAD area?  Has it already been initiated in the TAD?   
• What specifically might be a barrier to development in a particular area?  For 
instance, a brownfield might create a significant redevelopment barrier. 
• Is there a compelling finding of blight? 
• Is the tax base in the target area growing as fast or faster than the tax base in general?  
(This suggests that incentives for development such as TIF may not be warranted.) 
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More tightly developed “but for” considerations can be applied to developer/business 
initiated TADs and/or project specific TADs: 
 
• Are the improvements financed through the TAD a vital input or are they likely to 
simply contribute “excess profits” to the firm?  Consider where the developer might 
have located without these incentives and any influence incentives might have on the 
“bottom line.”   
 
One method of examining the “bottom line” impact is to estimate the “return on 
investment” (ROI) for a private firm with and without a public subsidy.  While a ROI 
analysis is instructive, this assessment is not sufficient to determine fully whether a 
development would have happened anyway as it does not assess the efficiency of the 
firm’s operations vis-à-vis its competitors.  Overall, research has found that in most 
cases the influence of public assistance is small on a firm’s bottom line. 
 
• Is the project one that would have developed in the metro area anyway (though 
perhaps in a different location)?  Depending on circumstances, a locality may want to 
consider the “but for” question in the context of the entire jurisdiction.  In other 
words, would the development occur somewhere else in the same jurisdiction “but 
for” the subsidy or assistance. If the answer is “yes,” then again the locality and 
overlapping jurisdictions are facing a loss of revenue that would otherwise be 
available.  However, returning to notions of “blight,” the public purpose may be to 
direct development to particularly difficult to develop areas and build a more even 
distribution of jobs and wealth.  Development in blighted areas may be seen as more 
likely to have a positive ripple effect on the surrounding community as well. 
 
• To what extent does the project simply displace or replace existing activity by 
creating unfair competition between assisted and non-assisted development or 




Structuring Public-Private Partnerships  
While the first line of defense for a locality against misapplication of TAD is a careful 
assessment of the feasibility and need for a particular project, localities may also want to 
employ economic development strategies and tools that help ensure that 1) developers or 
other private interests do not excessively profit off taxpayers and 2) that private interests 
make the investments claimed. 
 
• Requiring Up-Front Private Sector Investment First:  As will be discussed in Chapter 
3, the TIF arrangements can be structured so that the private sector investor is 
reimbursed for infrastructure investments or environmental clean-up through TIF 
rather than having the public sector implement the project or pay for it up front.   
 
• Equity Kickers:  This policy requires private developers to give the public participants 
a subordinated equity position in return for their participation.  This technique was 
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commonly used in the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Urban 
Development Action Grant (UDAG) program.  In the jargon of the day it was called 
an “equity kicker.”  If a development’s annual internal return on investment ever 
exceeds a negotiated level, the public participants get a share of the “excess return”.  
In this way, an overly cautious “but for” does not lead to a private economic profit at 
public expense. 
 
The April 30, 2001 Philadelphia Business Journal reported that in the $32 million 
Avenue of the Arts project, the developer received $6.25 million in assistance through 
TAD financing.  However, the agreement included an arrangement requiring the 
developer to pay the city 50¢ out of every $1 in excess of an annual $1.3 million 
return on his project (McCalla 2004). 
 
Pre-negotiated Specific Benefits from a Project 
Frequently, local governments and TIF supported development will have “agreements” or 
even contractual understandings regarding the timing of development, its final value, and 
benefits including, and in addition to, increased tax revenue flowing from a project.  
Frequently, provision of low- and moderate-income housing and job creation are 
expected benefits.  For example, in California, state law requires 20% of increment 
revenue be used for low- and moderate-income affordable housing.  Similarly, Atlanta’s 
Westside TAD planned at least 1,000 to 2,000 new housing units, in addition to Atlanta 
Housing Authority housing renovation, in the first ten to fifteen years of operation.  Also, 
many TIF subsidies of private projects are justified by promises of job creation.  The 
Westside plan speaks of creating as many as 13,000 jobs around Centennial Olympic 
Park, not to mention the remainder of the district.  Some states and localities have 
developed tools and techniques to further protect the public’s investment in TIF.  These 
include: 
 
• Regular audits:  The public interest organization “Good Jobs First” recommends 
annual reporting of progress toward plan implementation, including accounting for 
both the public and private financial resources generated and spent and the benefits 
produced (e.g. jobs created and wages, housing built, public works completed).   
 
Reliable data collection and reporting are essential to measuring the effectiveness of 
subsidies and monitoring the performance of projects.  Additionally, in the case of 
project specific TADs, such as Atlantic Station, communities may never know 
whether a company has kept its side of the bargain without effective monitoring.  
Many observers believe that monitoring must be done by an independent agency to be 
effective.  Minnesota and Maine are both cited as having good reporting requirements 
(Best Practices). 
    
• “Clawbacks:”  A clawback (also called “recapture”) is a contractual provision 
requiring a company to pay back all or part of a development subsidy, such as a grant, 
loan or tax break, if it fails to fulfill its responsibilities required by the subsidy 
agreement or program.  For example, if a TIF funded private development fails to 
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produce as many jobs as promised, it may be required to pay back the costs of 
infrastructure financed to assist the development.  
Covering the Costs of Public Service Provision 
One of the critical but often “under discussed” issues of TADs is their potential to bring 
Box 1.                                    
Schools and TIF 
 
School districts face a particular dilemma in the use of TIF.  First, they are often more 
dependent than other governments on property taxes, and thus projects that tie up a 
significant portion of the growth of their tax base are more likely to threaten their fiscal 
health.  Second, schools face a clear and direct cost from development that brings new 
families to a jurisdiction.   
 
On the other hand, because of their reliance on property taxes, if the TIF project is 
sound, a school district may benefit more than other overlapping jurisdictions by an 
investment that increases the long- term value of the property tax base.  Further, 
because they collect such a large share of total property tax, a school district’s 
“incremental” contribution to the TIF is often critical in making the project financially 
viable in the first place.   
 
In Georgia, unlike many other states, school districts must be directly consulted and 
must approve the use of their property tax increment in a TAD.  This provision gives 
school districts a critical role in the development of TAD and means that they should 
be particularly careful to educate themselves about the use of this financing instrument.  
 
While by no means a complete list, the following are some strategies adopted by states 
and school districts to hedge against the risks posed by TIF. 
 
• Complete a costs-benefits analysis to assess impact on school district over 
time from the proposed TAD.  As noted above, while school districts may be 
more at risk than other jurisdictions, they may also stand to benefit heavily 
from TAD generated growth! 
• Set stipulations on the use of TAD, such as limiting total amount of bonds, 
setting a date for termination of TAD, and setting requirements for recapture 
of a percentage of any excess return from the TAD that is not needed for debt 
service.  (See the East Point, Sandy Springs, Acworth, Marietta, and Smyrna 
TAD case studies in the Appendix to this document for  arrangements of this 
type.) 
• Require TIF districts to be limited to industrial and commercial development 
that will minimize increased service costs to schools. 
• By intergovernmental agreement with the initiating jurisdiction, require that 
the TIF base be adjusted periodically for inflationary increases in the property 
values to prevent degradation of existing tax base over time.  
• Require school district reimbursement for any increases in service demand 
(i.e. more children) generated in the TIF district.   
• Limit the amount of school district increment from inclusion in TAD by 
requiring an annual “rebate” of a portion of the school increment in an 
intergovernmental agreement with the initiating jurisdiction. 
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in growth that creates demand for public services: schools, parks, police, fire, health 
services, etc.  Also, while new infrastructure is likely to be financed through TIF, TIF 
does not account for service demands placed on infrastructure networks.  For instance, 
the cost of congestion of new development and subsequent needs to improve the regional 
transportation network may not be absorbed by the new development specifically.  
 
While many public services can absorb a certain amount of population increase without 
serious degradation in service, schools are particularly likely to be hit hard by TADs that 
take away their access to increases in tax base stimulated by the TAD yet increase service 
demand over the base amount.  In Georgia, school districts are also highly dependent on 
property tax revenues, and these problems have led to significant resistance to TIF by 
some school districts.  On the other hand, TADs do not necessarily create higher service 
costs.  By eliminating blight and promoting growth, there is potential that TADs might 
actually lower public service costs by improving infrastructure, reducing crime, etc.  
 
Yet, because of the potential for TADs to tie up tax base growth in infrastructure 
development (which in turn may be of uncertain value), some states have developed 
planning requirements that include detailed cost-benefits analyses.  Others have simply 
attempted to limit the scope of TIF that can be applied or have mandated increased 
participation by stakeholders, such as schools, that are likely to face the most serious 
fiscal consequences of incorrect usage of TIF.   
 
Assessing the Costs of TADs: 
Feasibility Study, Fiscal Impact Analysis, or Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Twenty states and the District of Columbia require some form of a feasibility, cost 
benefit, or fiscal impact study to support TAD designation.  Georgia does not, although 
such reports may be produced in conjunction with TAD projects anyway.   
 
Such analyses are intended to ensure that a TIF project generates more revenues than 
costs.  For example, a TIF in Pittsburgh for a new downtown department store project 
cost $130 million, but produced only $38 million in increased real property value 
(Montari 1999).  Conversely, other cost-benefit analyses have helped reassure school 
districts and other participating jurisdictions that they will likely see a solid return on 
their investment. 
 
However, being mindful of the different fiscal position of the initiating jurisdiction 
compared to other participating jurisdictions is important.  The ratio of costs to benefits 
for each government may be quite different.  Three general types of analysis are useful: 
 
• Feasibility Analysis:  A feasibility analysis focuses on the private sector investment in 
the TAD and will assess whether the proposed private development has a reasonable 
chance of success and thus, is likely to contribute the required increment necessary 
for financing TAD investments.  This type of analysis shows the expected return-on-
investment projected for proposed private developments and can serve as an analytic 
basis of a “but for” statement. 
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• Fiscal Impact Study: A fiscal impact study will show whether the net revenue to all 
involved governmental jurisdictions is positive in selected time frames.  Specifically, 
these studies ask whether the cost of providing expanded day-to-day services to the 
project plus the cost of capital support is less or more than the expected tax revenues 
at the end of five years, ten years, and so on. 
 
• Cost Benefit Study: Cost-benefit studies are the most comprehensive studies and will 
attempt to develop information on total community benefits, e.g., value of new jobs, 
or the benefit of new low- and moderate-income houses, as compared to the net 
public cost of supporting development.  Cost-benefit studies reach beyond fiscal 
impact studies, attempting to assess total community benefit, not simply government 
revenue.  
 
In some cases, analysis is undertaken via private consultants, in others, modeling is 
provided by or through the state government.  Examples of public sector models that 
have been developed include: 
 
• The Community Policy Analysis Center (CPAC) at the University of 
Missouri/Columbia has developed a regional economic analysis model: “Show Me.”  
The model has many different community applications.  In one case it was used to do 
a general cost-benefit analysis of a proposed TIF in Kirkland, Missouri. 
   
“As part of the cost-benefit analysis, CPAC analyzed the revenue structure of 
each jurisdiction to be impacted by the proposed TIF district.  Real property 
values that are contained in the proposed TIF district were also analyzed.  In 
addition, potential impacts on employment, labor force, and retail sales were 
estimated.  This study then projected how these changes could affect the local 
economy and the political subdivisions involved.” (Cox, Johnson, and 
Mundell 1999) 
   
• Georgia Tech’s Economic Development Institute has several fiscal and economic 
development impact analysis models in use.  LOCI can help a government assess the 
fiscal impact of new or expanding business.  A newer tool, WebFIT, can estimate the 
fiscal impact of a long-run land use plan on overlapping governments, e.g. a county, 
its municipalities, and school systems.  These tools have not yet been used on a TIF, 
but appear to be potentially applicable (Fiscal and Economic Research). 
 
Controlling the Costs of TADs 
While a TAD is active and the base is frozen, tax growth funds are diverted from general 
coffers to specific redevelopment/economic development projects.  To the extent that a 
TAD captures normal property value inflation or to the extent that any growth in the 
TAD creates a demand for additional local government services, a TAD can create 
“unfunded” burdens for day-to-day government operations.   
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Ideally, TIF is structured to capture just enough money to pay development costs, 
administer the project, and service debt.  It is common, however, for TIF districts to 
accumulate surplus funds.  Surpluses may accrue because of the success and health of 
TIF assisted projects, but there are other reasons that TIF increments may be greater than 
needed to cover project costs.  Restoration of surpluses to participating jurisdictions’ 
general funds (or prevention of their capture in the first place) may be important to help 
those governments provide needed public services and to prevent the degradation of their 
fiscal capacities as service demands rise.  It is likely to be particularly important for 
schools.   
 
Reasons TADs might generate surpluses include: 1) conservative initial estimates of the 
size of an increment, 2) sizing the TAD to capture non-blighted areas, 3) normal growth 
(inflation) in the tax base captured in increments, and 4) continuing diversion of 
increments to TADs long after original project improvements have been paid off.  TIF 
administration needs methods to limit accumulation of surpluses and return them to 
taxing jurisdictions (Johnson 2002). 
 
The following strategies reduce surplus funds available for TADs.  However, policy-
makers should make sure that they also consider need to ensure robust revenue streams 
for debt financing.  For instance, TADs may be sized larger than needed to capture 
incremental revenues from properties that are highly likely to appreciate in value even 
without a TAD investment While capture of these funds may reassure bondholders that 
they will be repaid, these funds may also be needed to pay for increased service demands 
created by new development. 
 
Strategies that are used to limit the scope of TADs and TAD surpluses include: 
 
• Recapture excess increments:  TAD laws in some states stipulate that revenues or 
increments received in excess of the amount approved in adopting resolutions revert 
to the general funds of the sponsoring governments in proportionate shares.   
 
Annual reversions prevent development agencies from building large accounts of 
“uncommitted funds” at the expense of funding day-to-day operations of participating 
local governments and school systems.  This technique is especially appropriate if a 
large TAD has been defined in effort to generate a large increment and reduce risk of 
default (New York City Independent Budget Office 2002).  
 
• Time Limits on TADs:  Enabling legislation in many states places specific limits on 
the life span of TADs and tax increment financing.  For instance, California requires 
designation of a time limit with each district.  Perhaps the most comprehensive set of   
“time bands” is in Minnesota’s law, which includes the following (McGarry et al. 
2001):  
 
 “5 year rule”: No additional tax increment debt may be issued five years after the 
inception of a project.  This is an effort to keep development authorities from 













































































Developing an Appropriately Sized TAD 
 
TADs can come in many shapes and sizes, everything from a very discrete project and TAD area such as the Atlantic
Steel and Princeton Lake TADs in Atlanta, the Camp Creek TAD in East Point, and the Lakeside Tad in Acworth, to
large sprawling TADs such as Atlanta’s Westside and Perry-Bolton, and the recently approved Eastside TAD.  These
latter, “mega-TADs,” may encompass many projects or may simply encompass an area that a jurisdiction would like to
develop. 
 
While projects may vary across many dimensions, some key considerations when scaling a TAD include: 
 
1)  Do the project boundaries capture sufficient projected incremental revenues to make TAD financing viable? How
much of the future growth in the overall tax base should be committed to economic development?   
 
On the one hand, capturing increments from areas that are already developing or are more likely to be
developable might be helpful in making any TAD financing financially viable; on the other hand, taking this
money represents an “earmark” on funds that would otherwise have gone into the general funds of
participating jurisdictions and thus could have been allocated to day-to-day operating expanses, other
government programs, or could have gone towards reducing taxes.   
 
2)  What is the strategy for using a TAD to promote economic development?  
 
If a TAD is initiated without significant private sector commitments then a jurisdiction needs to consider how
it will use TIF to attract development.  One alternative is to use the flexibility offered by a pre-existing
“mega-TAD,” including its powers of eminent domain, to tailor TIF based packages to the needs of
developers and businesses expressing an interest in the area.  Another is to allow TAD revenues to
accumulate and use the funds to make infrastructure investments on a pay-as-you-go (non-debt financed)
basis that might attract private sector investment.   
 
The problem with these strategies is that they may be very slow to stimulate development.  The private sector
simply may not be interested in the district, and without an initial project, the jurisdiction administering the
TAD may have to rely on inflationary increases in property values or improvements to existing properties to
accumulate the increment necessary to finance infrastructure.  In Chicago, of the 77 TIFs old enough to
generate increments, 45 have generated less than $1 million, 58% have less than $1 million and 44% have
less than $500,000 (Neighborhood Capital Budget Group 2003).  Further, long term capture of inflationary
increases in property values creates a slow degradation of a jurisdiction’s fiscal capacity to support on-going
public services. 
 
3)  Is the TAD likely to conflict with other economic development policies or projects? 
 
A benefit of a very discretely defined TAD is that the financing can be structured in such a way that would
be appropriate for a particular project.  In contrast, large TADs can become a problem when they start to
conflict with other economic development projects.  A good example is the early problems of the Techwood
(now Westside) TAD that saw large portions of this property taken off of the tax roles to develop Centennial
Olympic Park.   
 
4)  How flexible should the jurisdiction’s overall use of TAD financing be? 
 
An argument for a large TAD is that it allows a jurisdiction to respond more quickly to proposed
development in a targeted redevelopment area.  Jurisdictions have already committed any incremental funds
in the district and so do not have to revisit the planning and approval process.  Often large TADs, such as the
San Diego TIF district described in the introduction, have comprehensive redevelopment plans
outlining the goals and objective for which TIF financing will be available.   
 
5)  Is the TAD likely to be more successful if it encompasses multiple projects at once? 
 
Large TADs may be created to cluster projects together and a jurisdiction only need work through 
one planning process for multiple projects and can consider the proposed developments 
holistically.  One trade off is that some projects may be more viable than others and this problem 
may not emerge if all are considered as a part of a single TAD plan. 25 
 
 Reimbursement of School Districts:  Some states, California and Iowa, for 
example, reimburse school districts for diverted revenue during the life of a TAD.  
Georgia does not do this, but because schools must sign off directly on the use of 
their tax Different types of TADs have different completion rates.  An “economic 
development” TAD may only capture increments for eight years, but a 
“redevelopment” TAD may remain open for 25 years (Minn. Stat. § 469.176 
subd. 1b.).  
 
• Bounding the Area of a TAD:  In addition to placing time limits on TADs as a 
method for reducing potential overuse of these redevelopment tools, 22 states, 
including Georgia, limit the land area of individual or aggregate TADs and/or limit 
total property value included in TADs (Johnson 2002).  As cited earlier, Georgia’s 
law limits the aggregate TADs to 10% of the property tax base of any given 
jurisdiction (O.C.G.A. §36-44-17). Currently, Chicago has about 13% of its 
equalized assessed value in TADs; some fear this amount is excessive.   
 
 A State that is more restrictive than Georgia is Maine, which limits any given 
TAD to 2% of a municipality’s total area and all TADs in a municipality to 5% of 
the total area.  In addition, all TADs combined may not exceed 5% of the total tax 
value of a municipality.  (M.R.S.A. 30A§5253(B)-(C)) 
 
 
• increments in a TAD, school districts have negotiated a recapture of a certain 
percentage of revenues as well as time limits on the TAD with initiating jurisdictions 
(for example, see the conditions placed by Fulton County School District on the 
Camp Creek TAD in Appendix). 
 
• Limitations on TAD-Backed Debt:  Though debt limits will be discussed in more 
detail in the next Chapter, localities may also want to consider limiting the TAD-
backed debt issued.  Restrictions might include limiting the total value of debt that 
can be outstanding at any particular time or setting termination dates for the TAD 
concurrent with its bonds reaching maturity.  These provisions would prevent on-
going financing with incremental revenues.  
 
• Capture of Inflationary Increases in Base Assessed Value: Some states, such as 
California, require the base assessed value to include inflationary increases rather 




Using the Tax Increment to Secure Long-Term Debt 
 
Localities can use the captured tax increment in various ways.  Commonly, the initiating 
jurisdiction will issue debt based on the incremental revenue stream from projected 
property (or sales) tax growth, and use the money raised from bonds to make investments 
to enhance the “buildability” of a particular location.  Debt financed arrangements are 
often called “pay as you use” because of the projection of payments into the future as 
infrastructure or other capital investments are enjoyed.  Alternatively, the initiating 
jurisdiction may collect the increment and pay for investments in infrastructure as the 
funds accumulate in a “pay as you go” arrangement.  These arrangements typically 
involve infrastructure financed by developers on the condition that an initiating 
jurisdiction will use the tax increment accrued from the district to reimburse the 
developer for expenses incurred (Johnson 2002).  There are also creative ways to use TIF 
such as use of Maine’s “credit enhancements” (see Box 3).  San Diego has a policy of 
using “gap financing” as its preferred method of direct subsidy to private developers (see 
Box 4). 
 
In Georgia and in other states, TIF debt is highly flexible.  The debt is typically not 
counted as general obligation debt, and therefore, technically is not considered a 
commitment of the full faith and credit of the initiating jurisdiction.  As a result, the debt 
is also not counted against a jurisdictions debt limit nor does it trigger any voter referenda 
requirements for specific bond issues. 
 
However, this apparent dissociation of an initiating jurisdiction from the risk of the debt 
can prove illusory.  Whether legally binding or not, TIF bonds generally are viewed by 
the capital markets as “moral obligations” of the initiating jurisdiction, and one or more 
defaults could, and probably would, adversely affect a jurisdiction’s standing in the 
markets and increase its general cost of borrowing.   For instance, when the Englewood 
Urban Renewal Authority defaulted on a $27 million TIF bond issue, Moody’s Investors 
Service downgraded the City of Englewood’s general obligation bond rating from A1 to 
A, citing the inextricable links between the city and the authority, regardless of how the 
debt was ultimately secured (Johnson 2001).   
 
In Georgia, where state law requires the initiating jurisdiction – be it a city, a county or a 
consolidated government – to be the issuer of TAD bonds, this risk may be greater.  Even 
were the locality to be unconcerned with its bond rating, a default on TIF backed bonds 
could potentially compromise the long-term capacity of that jurisdiction or its 
redevelopment agency to engage in a variety of economic development finance activities. 
 
Also, TIF debt is often considered highly risky and thus is likely to be more expensive as 
a locality must pay a premium to induce bondholders to hold this kind of debt.  For 
instance, the yield on the longest maturity of TAD bonds issued by the City of Atlanta in 
October 2001 for the Atlantic Station project was 8% at a time when the City’s own 




Using TIF for Credit Enhancements 
In Maine a 1993 amendment to their TIF statute created a TIF financing option called credit 
enhancement agreements (CEAs).  This option permits a municipality to return all or part of an annual 
increment directly to the private concern whose investment created the increment, thereby enhancing 
that business’s credit; perhaps allowing it to borrow in the first place.  Michael Starn, Editor of the 
Maine Townsman notes:   
“Credit enhancement agreements permit the "captured" property tax dollars to be 
channeled directly to the business doing the development. The money must be used 
for the project but the business is given considerable latitude in its use of these 
funds, unless stipulated otherwise by the municipality. 
“CEAs have infused new life into the tax increment financing program. Since the 
CEA change, TIF activity has skyrocketed. Over the past two years, according to 
Alan Brigham at the Maine Department of Economic and Community Development, 
there have been 33 approved projects, most of them using credit enhancement 
agreements. 
“Businesses appear to like the flexibility that a CEA has in directly reducing their 
development costs. Communities without infrastructure needs are able to offer a tax 
incentive to potential developers. Municipalities also like CEAs because they carry 
less risk - they are performance based. Unlike infrastructure investments that involve 
long-term payments which continue whether or not the project is successful, CEAs 





































 Box 4. 
Using TIF for Gap Financing Loans 
 
“Gap Financing” with subordinated loans was first widely used in the federal Urban Development
Action Grant (UDAG) program during the Carter administration.  Cities received UDAG money from
the federal government, and loaned that money to private development projects in the form of a
negotiated subordinated loan in an amount and at terms necessary to close the “gap” between what
private equity and loans would contribute in a high risk project (e.g., downtown redevelopment in a
blighted areas) and what was needed to make a financially viable project.  UDAGs were not made in
the absence of private equity investment and loans of the amount and type typical for lower risk
projects.  Public investment was usually highly leveraged.  Loans funds repaid to a city were kept by
the city to be recycled into additional redevelopment activities. 
 
Gap financing in the form of loans has been adapted to TIF and is the preferred method of channeling
redevelopment funds into development projects in San Diego.  Tax increment dollars are used to
“leverage” private investment. All project proposals presented to the redevelopment agency must
include a financial proforma that identifies all costs anticipated for the project and demonstrates the
developer’s ability to achieve conventional financing prior to discussions regarding the need for
assistance to close any existing “gap.”   Property owners are encouraged to work with CCDC to
negotiate projects that remove blight and reach redevelopment project objectives (Centre City





In an effort to ensure sufficient revenues and to assure bondholders of the security for the 
bonds, localities may face a further trade off.  In some states, and more recently in 
Georgia, the state has permitted TIF debt to be backed or even directly financed by all the 
property taxes collected in the designated tax allocation district as well as by sales tax 
(and other tax) increments generated in the district.  The temptation then is to attach a 
more secure revenue stream to back the debt, potentially garner a higher rating, and 
generally increase the “purchasing power” of the debt issued (as less has to be paid to 
bondholders for less risky borrowing).  However, this added security means that an even 
greater portion of the tax base is potentially encumbered by the TIF debt. 
 
Policies that Help Mitigate the Risks of TIF Debt 
 
While tax increment, or tax allocation, financing has brought about numerous benefits to 
implementing communities in the form of increased economic development and needed 
additions to public infrastructure, the use of TIF backed debt poses significant risks to 
virtually every party to a TIF plan.  Initiating jurisdictions are exposed to project failures 
and the political and credit-related risks that can attend them.  TIF bond investors risk the 
loss of all or a portion of their investment, and face risk of adverse tax consequences if 
their bonds somehow lose their exemption from federal and/or state income taxation.  
 
 
Risk of Insufficient Incremental Growth 
 
In general, most of the risks inherent in tax increment financing stem from the gamble of 
using a financing stream based on yet to be realized future increases in the value of 
property tax revenues.  Both economic problems and policy changes can reduce the 
amount of property taxes collected and put the debt in jeopardy.  The risk to issuing 
jurisdictions is default and the subsequent need to intervene to cover debt payments.  
Bondholders face a risk of loss of money if revenues are insufficient.  
 
These risks may be caused by 1) insufficient appreciation in assessed value, 2) decreases 
in tax rate, and 3) failure to collect the appropriate incremental increases in value. 
 
Problems that may decrease level of property tax collected include: 
 
• Public land acquisition in a TAD, reducing the amount of taxable property. 
• Project failure, downsizing, or delay. 
• Private sector firm failure. 
• Economic downturn. 
• Default on property tax payment by major property owners. 
• Changes in law or policy increasing tax exemptions or abatements. 
• Unanticipated successful assessment appeals. 
• Natural catastrophe. 
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Addressing the Risk:  The risks of TIF debt can be reduced by the using sound planning.   
When estimating TIF revenues, planners should be conservative in their growth 
estimates.  Also, the importance of assessing the feasibility of private sector investment is 
critical.  Developer initiated project specific TADs are likely to have a feasibility analysis 
“in hand”.  General “economic development district” TADs often start with no project 
and, consequently, no market of feasibility testing.   
 
Beyond good planning, however, there are hedging tactics to against the risk of 
insufficient appreciation in property values.  Hedges to ensure that developers and other 
private sector investors do not back out of the project include:   
 
• Use of binding agreements on degree and timing of private investment, i.e., developer 
must pay the anticipated tax increment regardless of whether the increment has been 
generated by the proposed development; 
 
• Requiring private sector investors develop the project first and using TIF on a 
reimbursement basis;  as has been done in Atlanta with Atlantic Station; 
 
• Use of “pay as you go” arrangements letting TIF increments accumulate either prior 
to issuing debt or simply using funds to cover redevelopment expenses as they 
accumulate without issuing debt.  This approach is used in Chicago’s neighborhood 
TIFs.  Funds tend to accumulate slowly. 
 
Alternatively, a local government can secure a TIF with other public sector revenues.  
Ensuring that TIF financing is financially secure may increase the bond rating and/or 
reduce the costs of debt because bondholders are more certain of repayment.  It is 
important to note, however, that many of the policies that enhance TIF credit conflict 
with policies designed to limit the scope of the revenues captured by TIF and protect 
local revenues needed for on-going public services.    
 
Policies to ensure coverage of TIF debt obligations include:   
 
• Back property tax based TIF debt with sales tax increments collected within the TAD 
(recently permitted by State of Georgia).  Sales taxes, however, tend to be volatile 
and are reduced during economic downturns (as is the case now).   
 
• Back TIF debt with all property tax revenues collected in the TIF district.  In Georgia, 
this requires a finding that the incremental taxes will be insufficient.  
 
• Expand the size of the TIF district to encompass non-blighted properties and/or 
properties that are highly likely to appreciate. 
 







Risk of Future Tax Policy Changes 
Tax rate cuts by a participating jurisdiction could cause the amount of tax collected to 
decline.  Georgia law precludes this possibility by setting minimum tax rates in Tax 
Allocation Districts if debt has been issued:  
 
…a political subdivision or county or independent board of education consenting 
to the inclusion of its property taxes as a basis for computing a tax allocation 
increment base within a tax allocation district, as provided in Code Section 36-44-
9, may not decrease its ad valorem tax millage rate on taxable property located 
within that district below the millage rate levied on that property on the last date 
tax allocation bonds were issued for redevelopment costs of that district. (§36-44-
15(b)) 
 
An important point for policy-makers to consider when adopting a TAD is that the 
creation of a TAD may reduce their flexibility to decrease taxes for property owners in 
the district or in their entire jurisdiction. Because Georgia’s Constitution requires 
“uniformity of taxation,” local governments become locked in to a minimum tax rate 
established during the formation of a TAD.  Another dilemma may be created by state 
law changes that decrease or cap increases in assessed valuations, authorize alternative 
forms of local taxation (if such alternatives also result in a rollback in property tax rates), 
and/or change state school funding laws to replace local levies with state education 
dollars.4   
 
Addressing the Risk:  Localities may want to monitor proposed State changes to assessed 
property values, millage rates, exemptions, and so on to assess their impact on local 
TADs.  Additionally, creating TADs as Special Districts, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
would insulate TADs from other taxing jurisdictions and protect their tax rates and 
revenues from challenges based on the uniformity clause if jurisdiction-wide rates 
change.  
 
Risk That TIF Debt Is Not Tax Exempt 
An important concern for the holders of TIF bonds is the risk that the interest on their 
bonds may lose its exemption from federal income taxation, which most debt instruments 
of state and local governments enjoy. If lost, the federal government will collect taxes 
from bondholders from the date of the bonds’ original issuance.   
 
Internal Revenue Service rules limit the extent to which tax-exempt bonds may be used 
for private purposes and/or secured by anything other than “generally applicable taxes”.  
Generally, more than 10% of the proceeds of such bonds may be used to fund privately 
owned improvements (if state TIF laws allow it) only if at least 90% of bond debt service 
                                                 
4 S.B. 510, introduced (but not passed) in the 2004 session of the Georgia General Assembly, is one 
example of such property tax relief bills and would have allowed to Fulton County property taxpayers a 
homestead exemption equal to the difference between their “base year assessment” and any future 
assessment as long as they owned and occupied their home. 
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is payable from tax revenues within a TIF district that apply equally to all district 
taxpayers.  In such cases, extreme care must be exercised to eliminate any special 
arrangements with TIF district taxpayers that would cause their taxes to become 
something other than “generally applicable.”  For instance, any of the following would 
violate this rule: 1) an agreement with a TIF district taxpayer waiving the taxpayer’s right 
to appeal his or her property assessment, 2) an agreement that guarantees payment of 
taxes in certain minimum amounts, 3) an agreement that indemnifies other TIF taxpayers 
against any future tax increases, or 4) the posting of any security (e.g., a privately backed 
bank letter of credit) as additional security for bond repayment.  On the other hand, more 
than 10% of TIF bond debt service may be secured by sources of funds other than 
generally applicable taxes within a TIF district if at least 90% of TIF bond proceeds are 
used to fund governmentally owned assets.  Many states restrict the use of TIF bond 
proceeds (and incremental tax revenues, in general) to publicly owned infrastructure.  In 
these states any number of private guarantees of bond repayment are possible.   
 
Addressing the Risk:  In states such as Georgia, where bond proceeds may be used to pay 
virtually any redevelopment cost, including improvements to private property, the risk of 
bonds being designated “private activity bonds” under IRS rules, even years after their 
original issuance, is real and should be monitored by initiating jurisdictions and their 
legal counsel carefully and continuously.  Localities might also want to consider being 
conservative in the purposes for which they issue TIF bonds.  For example, they may 
want to  issue bonds only to pay for any public infrastructure components of TIF projects. 
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Chapter 4 
Problems and Issues with Georgia’s Redevelopment Powers Law 
 
Georgia’s Redevelopment Powers Law provides cities, counties and consolidated 
governments in the state with significant flexibility in revitalizing blighted areas.  By 
defining redevelopment activities broadly, it allows sponsoring communities wide 
latitude in shaping the kinds of projects and public-private partnerships necessary to 
improve local economies.  By requiring a judgment that “but for” the exercise of the 
Law’s powers, redevelopment within a TAD would not occur, and by providing for 
public review and input, it may inhibit initiating jurisdictions from undertaking 
redevelopment projects of questionable benefit.   By requiring the consent of 
participating jurisdictions to the inclusion of their respective portions of incremental tax 
revenues in paying redevelopment costs, it prevents local government sponsors from 
usurping the tax revenues of other entities.  Moreover, allowing the possibility of 
payments to participating jurisdictions to compensate them for tax revenues foregone as 
an eligible redevelopment cost provides a means by which participants may benefit from 
TAD development more immediately.  Finally, the Law’s provisions governing TAD 
bonds imposes some fiscal discipline on initiating jurisdictions and protects the interests 
of TAD bondholders.      
 
However, implementation of the Law’s provisions in many jurisdictions throughout the 
state has been hindered by a number of legal and practical constraints – some of which 
are discussed below.   
 
Referendum Requirement.  Chief among the constraints inhibiting local government’s 
use of the Law is its requirement that authority to implement the Law’s enumerated 
powers must be approved by the registered voters of a prospective initiating jurisdiction.  
Because the debt obligations of a local government issuing TAD bonds are not and 
cannot technically be secured by the full faith and credit of a sponsoring local 
government, many local governments may see the referenda requirements as an 
unnecessary impediment to pursuing local economic development objectives.  Many feel 
the fact that local governments are held responsible by the markets and by bond rating 
agencies for non-general obligation debt such as revenue debt and debt issued by 
subordinate jurisdictions (e.g., development authorities) is sufficient protection for local 
taxpayers.  Regardless, in many jurisdictions in the Atlanta metropolitan area have 
successfully received approval from voters to use TIF.  Further removal of this 
requirement is unlikely as it is embedded in the State Constitution and its removal would 
involve statewide voter approval.   
 
TAD Termination and Size Limits.  The Law imposes no time limit on the life of a TAD, 
providing only that one shall exist until all redevelopment costs have been paid.  
Additionally, the Law does not limit the physical size of TADs, individually or in the 
aggregate.  Although it restricts the term of any single issue of TAD bonds to 30 years, 
and any contract with private entities to this same term, the Law does not prevent an 
initiating jurisdiction from amending a TAD plan numerous times, issuing several series 
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of TAD bonds or entering into serial agreements with different private sector participants, 
each having successive 30-year terms.   
 
Total assessed tax base in aggregated TADs is restricted.  A new TAD, at the time of its 
establishment, may not push the total assessed value in TADs to more than ten percent of 
the jurisdiction’s total assessment base.  Even so, within this framework, a mega-TAD 
could be created and effectively last forever.  For this reason, many states impose 25-30 
year limits on the life of TIF districts, and nine states restrict their number, not by their 
aggregate values (which tends to penalize jurisdictions with successful redevelopment 
programs), but by their geographic size.   Other states limit the amount of time in which 
actual project work must be initiated.  If a project does not begin in a specified period, the  
TAD will expire. 
 
Consent of Participating Jurisdictions.  In a few cases, participating jurisdictions had 
refused to give consent until after an initiating jurisdiction had acted to create the TAD.  
This raised the possibility that consent would not have been not legally binding, even 
though TAD bonds, secured in part by the tax increments from such jurisdictions, had 
already been issued.  SB 514, enacted by the 2004 General Assembly, clarified this issue 
by requiring an initiating jurisdiction simply obtain consent from participating 
jurisdictions prior to the inclusion of their respective portion of the incremental taxes 
regardless of the date of TAD creation. 
 
Use of Non-Property Tax Increments.  The inability under the Law to pledge certain 
non-property taxes to pay redevelopment costs (including debt service on TAD bonds) 
had, until this year, restricted an initiating jurisdiction’s financial flexibility in 
implementing a redevelopment plan.  However, SB 514 now allows the direct pledge of 
these revenues, increasing the leverage available to cover costs.   
 
By pledging the local option sales taxes collected within a TAD, particularly one 
involving commercial and mixed-use developments, an initiating jurisdiction could pay 
TAD redevelopment costs more quickly, and/or reduce the need to involve the property 
tax increments of participating jurisdictions.  By enacting this amendment to the Law, 
Georgia jointed nine other states plus the District of Columbia in allowing the use of 
sales tax increments, along with incremental property tax revenues, to pay redevelopment 
costs.  
 
As a practical matter, however, measuring the local sales taxes collected, or that may be 
collected, within a TAD is compromised by other deficiencies in Georgia state law and 
practices. The chief deficiency is the lack of any means, or legal mandate, by which the 
State Revenue Department, the State’s sales tax collector, can accurately record 
collections by point of sale.  As a result, despite this year’s amendment to the Law 
allowing the pledge of local sales taxes to pay redevelopment costs within a TAD, its 




Expansion of TAD Boundaries.  If the geraphic boundaries of a TAD are expanded, the 
Law requires that the base assessed value of a TAD be reset to the TAD’s assessed value 
in the year of expansion.  This provision limits an initiating jurisdiction’s capacity to 
make even minor revisions in TAD boundaries.  Whatever the requirement’s original 
motivation, its unintended consequence has been to provide initiating jurisdictions an 
incentive to create larger TADs.  Oversized TADs unnecessarily deprive all participating 
jurisdictions of the incremental tax revenues needed to support general government 
services.  
 
Minimum TAD Tax Rates.  The Law’s requirement that initiating and participating 
jurisdictions may not impose a property tax rate less than that imposed when TAD bonds 
were issued, while friendly to TAD bondholders, may run afoul of the state constitutional 
provision requiring uniformity of tax rates throughout a taxing jurisdiction.  The risk of 
running afoul of the constitution may eventually provide a significant disincentive for 
development within a TAD.   
 
Article VII, Section I, Paragraph III of the Georgia Constitution requires that, except in 
the case of certain enumerated situations, “all taxation shall be uniform upon the same 
class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.”  The 
Constitution does allow cities and counties within the State to create “special districts” 
within which certain services (including “community redevelopment” services) may be 
provided and taxes, assessments, and fees may be levied to pay for such services (Article 
IX, Section II, Paragraph VI); however, the Law does not explicitly provide that TADs 
constitute such special districts.  As a result, the Law’s provision for minimum tax rates 
within TADs may be subject to legal challenge and, for this reason or others, has not been 
complied with by participating jurisdictions thus far.  Clarification of this issue in the 
General Assembly is warranted. 
 
In working to clarify the issue in the General Assembly, local jurisdictions are faced with 
tax policy choices.  If on the one hand, tax rates in TADs were allowed or required to 
vary and tax rates decrease within a total jurisdiction, TAD bond holders may take legal 
because as tax rates decrease, tax allocation increments securing their bonds also fall 
reducing the security and value of the bonds.  On the other hand, allowing the remainder 
of a jurisdiction’s tax rates to vary while maintaining fixed tax rates in a TAD could, over 
time, result in significantly higher tax rates within a TAD than without, creating a 
disincentive for private investment in the TAD.  
 
Conflict with “Education Purpose” Clause.  A final, and potentially significant, legal 
conflict arises in the Law’s provision for school districts to participate in a TAD’s 
redevelopment.  The Law clearly anticipates local school districts’ ability to consent to 
the inclusion of their portions of any tax allocation increments created within a TAD to 
pay TAD redevelopment costs.  However, the State Constitution, in Article VIII, Section 
VI, Paragraph I(b), provides that “school tax funds shall be expended only for the support 
and maintenance of public schools, public vocational-technical schools, public education, 
and activities necessary or incidental thereto, including school lunch purposes.”  
Therefore, to allow use of a portion of a local school tax levy to pay costs unrelated to an 
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educational purpose may put a school district in conflict with this constitutional 
provision.   
 
On the other hand, to exclude that portion of tax increments attributable to a local school 
levy, which typically constitutes half or more of such increments, risks gutting an 
initiating jurisdiction’s ability to afford its redevelopment objectives.  Participating 
school districts have attempted to reconcile this conflict by requiring that a portion of tax 
increments be used for the construction of new schools, improvements to existing schools 
and the implementation within a TAD of job training or other educational activities 
and/or that a portion of the increments be returned to the districts as payments in lieu of 
taxes foregone.   
 
In an opinion dated December 11, 2001, Georgia’s Attorney General concluded that these 
kinds of arrangements essentially comply with the Constitution’s “educational purpose” 
clause.5  In addition, some legal experts have argued that, because their portions of 
incremental taxes generated in a TAD are never actually returned to local school districts, 
but rather are returned by local tax collectors directly to initiating cities or counties, they 
never truly become “school tax funds,” and, thus, their use by such jurisdictions to pay 
redevelopment costs does not conflict with this constitutional provision.  The issue has 
not been settled. 
 
Personal Property Taxes.  Personal property values and the values of utility properties 
are included in calculation of jurisdictions’ total property tax bases, but have often not 
been included in the calculation of TAD property tax bases or increments.  The reason is 
that it is difficult to tie-down the actual locations of personal and utility property in a 
jurisdiction.  Over 17 percent of Atlanta’s property tax base is comprised of personal and 
utility property.  A potential problem arises from the inability to assign personal and 
utility property to a TAD location. The Law limits TADs to 10 percent of the property tax 
base.  Suppose that a new TAD, combined with existing TADs, would total a reported 9 
percent of the total base.  It is possible that someone could argue that the City does not 
comply with the limit specified in the Law because the City has not included personal 
and utility property in the calculation of the TAD property tax base.  The actual property 
tax base included in TADs may exceed 10 percent of the City’s total property tax base, 
and the city has acted illegally. 
                                                 
5  Letter from Attorney General Thurbert E. Baker to Charles S. Johnson, III, Attorney for City of East 








This Chapter presents recommendations for the implementation of a local TAD policy 
and suggests modifications of TAD policies at the state level.  Because each TAD is 
unique, these recommendations are ones that are sufficiently general that they can apply 
to TAD policies in general.  For a method of avoiding some of the costs and risks of a 
particular TAD, please see the cost-risk matrix.   
 
The advantage of TAD is that it allows the capture of increments from overlapping taxing 
governments, a pooling of resources not available with any other tool, and the ability to 
leverage future revenues.  But a TAD does have costs, the most obvious being a diversion 
of resources, for a while, from provision of day-to-day local government services.  
 
This report shows that TAD projects in some areas appear to have produced important 
redevelopment benefits; however, we have also seen that state and local governments 
across the country are continually wrestling with fundamental issues of appropriately 
structuring TADs.  These governments as well as those in Georgia have developed a 
number of tactics to capitalize on the benefits of TADs while trying to hedge against the 
costs and risks.  With these considerations in mind, we offer the following 
recommendations: 
 
Actions Prior to Initiating a TAD 
 
1.  Develop TADs as part of an overall planning and economic development 
strategy.  In particular, a locality should identify the areas that should be targeted 
for redevelopment, the critical public purposes that will be served by TAD, and the 
types of projects that are appropriate for TAD backing.   
 
While this should not necessarily preclude the use of TAD to assist with innovative 
projects that fall outside this framework, fitting TADs into a broader economic 
development strategy will help 1) ensure that jurisdictions do not use up their TAD 
capacity on projects that are not priorities;  2) ensure that TAD is appropriately applied 
and does not conflict with broader policy priorities or with other economic development 
strategies; and  3) consider overall resources expended for economic development 
purposes.  An economic development budget may be particularly helpful in assessing 
total resources directed to economic development.    
 
2.  Establish a set of clearly defined economic development goals for which TAD can 
be used.  TADs should be particularly targeted to projects where private sector 
investment is unlikely without public sector stimulus.   
 
Private sector investments are unlikely when there are unusual costs, for example, for 
brown field site preparation, or low returns on affordable housing. Thus, TADs may be 
an important strategy in ameliorating significantly blighted areas, promoting 
environmental remediation, or stimulating reuse of abandoned industrial properties.  
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Depending on the priorities of jurisdictions participating in a TAD, TADs may also help 
promote mixed income development and the development of transit.   
 
3.  Conduct a full and careful feasibility, fiscal impact, and cost-benefit analyses of 
proposed TAD projects.   
 
These assessments are the only way to assess the value of the project to the participating 
jurisdictions, the risks involved, and the amount and form of government investment that 
is needed and appropriate.  Such studies are important because they assess the impact of 
the project on the fiscal health of the jurisdictions involved and help assess the potential 
viability of any bonds issued from TAD revenues. 
 
4.  Avoid government-initiated speculative projects.   
 
The greater the involvement from private sector partners from the beginning the better.  
All of the successful projects reviewed in the Introduction had significant developer 
participation and commitment from the outset.  By initiating projects with no identified 
private sector commitment, the government runs the risk of adopting projects based on 
hope and a prayer rather than market reality. 
 
5. Work with strong private sector actors. 
 
Prior to making any contractual commitments, jurisdictions should carefully research the 
reliability, development experience and capacity, and financial strength of all private 
parties.  Avoid entering into TAD development agreements with private developers who 




Structuring TAD Arrangements 
 
6.  Shift the risk of TADs to the private sector by minimizing direct government 
contribution to a project or upfront contribution to a project.   
 
Good examples of policies to minimize public sector risk include the Atlantic Station 
policy of developer reimbursement (see Appendix) and San Diego’s policy of providing 
financing to private redevelopers as “gap filling loans,” rather than as a direct subsidy.   
 
7.  Clearly specify the public benefits to be produced by the private sector entity 
receiving TAD assistance and include meaning sanctions for failure to meet agreed 
upon goals. 
 
The government should make clear upfront what it expects from the private sector in 
return for TAD assistance, if the expectation includes more than the mere redevelopment 
of a property in a distressed area.  For example, for a housing project, the government 
should clearly state the number of affordable units and the price points for those units and 
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should hold the developer accountable through binding development agreements, claw-
back provisions, or other policies. 
 
8.  Bound the time-period during which a TAD investment can be made. 
 
Supporting a developer using TAD financing should be bounded by a particular time 
period, for instance 5 years.  If private sector investments have not been initiated by the 
end of this period, the jurisdiction should re-evaluate the project and reclaim its TAD 
capacity, which may then be redirected to other projects or, if the TAD is project-
specific, to the general funds of participating jurisdictions.   
 
9.  Set clear limits on the duration of the TAD and on the amount of debt that can be 
issued in a particular TAD. 
 
Establishing a TAD with no time or debt limit can risk committing excessive resources to 
a particular area or project and may limit a locality’s ability to establish other TADs.  
California and Minnesota practices both provide examples of project performance 
deadlines and final project termination deadlines. 
 
10.  Size TAD bonds only on the value of real property tax increments. 
Even though Georgia Law provides that TAD bonds can be backed by funding sources in 
addition to real property tax increments, TAD bonds should be sized as if property tax 
increments were the only security.  Personal property increments, sales tax increments, 
and other forms of revenue generated within TADs should be used only for debt coverage 
(i.e., to increase the creditworthiness of the bonds and reduce their cost) and, if not 
needed to pay debt service or other contractually committed expenses, returned in 
proportional share to participating jurisdictions each year.   
 
Sources of revenue other than taxes on real property can be volatile.  Sales tax revenues, 
for example, can fluctuate markedly from year to year depending on overall economic 
trends.  Personal property taxes, particularly on inventories, may also fluctuate each year, 
and taxes on furniture, fixtures, and equipment actually decrease each year as they 
depreciate.  Avoiding use of volatile sources of revenue as primary sources of bond 
repayment and using them instead as sources of “backup” security is prudent policy.   
 
11. Avoid over-sizing TADs to direct funds arising from natural growth to economic 
development purposes. 
 
If an area larger than a project’s “benefit area” is needed to generate sufficient tax 
increments then the project may be of questionable value or TAD may not be the 
appropriate tool. Including areas that are not going to benefit from a TAD-financed 
project means that a jurisdiction is simply capturing general fund revenues from natural 
growth or inflation (from themselves and overlapping jurisdictions) which might 
otherwise be spent on schools, police, fire, parks, etc. and dedicating it to economic 
development purposes.  Jurisdictions may face some incentive to capture such revenues 
in order to access a wider pool of revenues to back TAD debt.  If jurisdictions decide to 
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do this as a means of pooling general fund revenues for economic development purposes 
and/or for backing TAD debt, this strategy should be made explicit in the redevelopment 
plan and the trade offs evaluated accordingly.  Jurisdictions should also consider the 
implications for the 10 percent ceiling on taxable property that can be dedicated to TADs. 
 
12.  Consider clustering adjacent projects   
 
Clustering adjacent compatible projects may reduce the cost and risk of a single project 
and/or allow the jurisdiction to meet other important public purposes through TAD.  
Petco Park is a good example.  The overall project incorporated several projects into one 
“action plan.”  The projects included a baseball stadium and revitalization of the 
surrounding neighborhoods.  The second part of the plan “guaranteed” the generation of 
the tax increment needed to support the first component.   
 
 
Evaluation and Audit 
 
13.  Develop annual performance audits or evaluations, as well as financial audits, to 
determine private sector progress towards agreed upon goals and to show how 
public funds are being used to support the TAD redevelopment plan.   
 
Regular audits will bring increased transparency to the process for both the public and 
private sector and will help reassure participating jurisdictions that their incremental tax 
revenues are used wisely. 
 
State Law and Administrative Changes 
 
14.  Specify that TADs are Special Districts as authorized by Article IX, Section II, 
Paragraph VI of the Georgia Constitution and therefore avoid conflict with 
Constitutional uniformity of taxation provisions.  
 
While some now argue that TADs already are Special Districts, the law is not clear.  If a 
TAD is not considered a Special District, millage rate differences that arise between 
frozen bases in TADs and reduced general property tax rates effective throughout a 
jurisdiction may give rise to constitutional issues of uniformity of taxation.   
 
15.  Modify state sales tax administration so that the state can identify point of 
origin of sales taxes.   
 
Currently, the Department of Revenue does not identify point of sales below the county 
level.  Providing for point of origin of sales tax for smaller areas, i.e., TADs, will allow 






16.  Change Redevelopment Powers Law to clarify that when TAD boundaries are 
expanded, this shift will not “reset” the base property value for the entire TAD.  
Only the newly added areas will have its property tax base frozen at the time the 
district is expanded.  
 
This change is designed to remove an incentive for setting very large initial TADs that is 
probably an unintended consequence of the current “resetting” requirement. 
 
17.  Clarify the role of state-assessed property (for example utilities) in the 
calculation of the tax increment for a TAD.   
 
Utility properties and personal are included in a jurisdiction’s general property tax base, 
but, including these type properties in TAD property valuations has proven difficult.  The 
State, which assesses utility property does not keep records of their specific locations and 
most personal property is not taxed at a specific site.  The easiest, and probably best, 
solution is to exclude both utility and personal property values from both the tax 
allocation increment base and subsequent calculations of tax allocation increments.  In 
making any changes however, state officials will need to make sure that the measure is 





Risks/Costs Policies to hedge against risks and costs 
Loss of fiscal capacity due to cumulative effects of 
TAD and other economic development policies. 
Place TAD in overall framework of economic development policies:   
• Consider TADs during development of local General Plan;  
• Create unified economic development budget. 
Unnecessarily giving away future fiscal capacity 
for economic development purposes.   
 
Can be caused by:  
• creating conditions where businesses 
/developments shift from one part of a 
jurisdiction to another;  or 
• giving businesses/developers subsidies that 
they don’t need, or 
• private sector partners renege or are unable to 
provide agreed upon public benefits  
Either establish that development would not have occurred otherwise or public purpose is sufficiently 
strong to accept risk that development would have occurred otherwise.   
• Establishment of “blight finding” or other clear reasons that property would be unlikely to develop 
without public sector assistance; or that some broader public purpose is served through the TAD aid. 
• Establishment that “but for” the subsidy development would not have occurred. 
• Evaluation of return on investment (ROI) for private sector business to determine importance of 
subsidy in making profit on investment. 
 
Structuring a TAD to ensure that public sector benefits from private sector profits. 
• Equity kickers: if private sector business/developer makes profit higher than anticipated; public sector 
receives a return on the investment 
• Pre-negotiated specific benefits: ensure that public purposes are served such as meeting needs for low 
to moderate income housing, job creation, etc. 
o Audit to ensure that private sector follows through on promised benefits. 
o Clawback to ensure company pays back any public sector support if promised benefits do not 
materialize. 
Investing in development that creates costs that are 
higher than revenues. 
 
Costs may be a result of: 
• Increased service demand (most seriously, 
more children attending schools, but can be 
other costs) 
• Costs of TAD financed project 
• Conduct cost-benefit or fiscal impact analysis 
o Must be done for each overlapping jurisdiction as costs and benefits may be distributed 
differently 
• Reimbursement of school districts some or portion of incremental revenues collected since costs may 
be unduly borne by school districts. 
Unnecessarily giving away too much future fiscal 
capacity to TAD. 
• Review impact of TAD on multi-year budget or create “economic development budget” to assess  
overall impact of economic development policies 
• Develop agreements to recapture excess increments of a TAD; limiting the revenues that can be 
collected from a TAD 
• Reimbursement of school districts 
• Time limits on TADs 
• Bounding the area of TADs  
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• Time, amount, or other limitations on TAD-backed debt 
• Keep inflationary increases in the “base assessed value” of the district 
(Note:  These may conflict with criteria needed to reassure bondholders of the security of TIF bonds.) 
Equity concerns: TAD is used to displace low to 
moderate income families. 
• Finding of blight 
• Requiring low to moderate income housing to be protected/developed in TAD  
(Note:  This may conflict with desire to keep public service costs low in a TAD district as housing tends to 
be more service intensive than commercial development because of schooling needs.) 
Insufficient revenues generated by TAD to cover 
debt obligations. 
 
Can be caused by:  
• public land acquisition,  
• project failure, downsizing, or delay 
• private sector firm failure 
• economic downturn 
• default on property tax payment by major 
property owners 
• changes in law or policy increasing tax 
exemptions or abatements 
• unanticipated successful assessment appeals 
• natural catastrophe 
 
 
While TAD debt is not backed by the full faith and credit of an issuing jurisdiction, if TIF revenues are 
insufficient and a local government allows TIF bonds to default, it may face a lower bond rating, higher 
costs of issuing debt, and a degradation of its capacity to invest in future economic development projects. 
 
Policies to assist with avoiding revenue shortfalls include: 
• Rigorous assessment of feasibility of private sector projects and/or likelihood that public sector 
investments will generate sufficient future growth! 
• Use of binding agreements with private sector investor on degree and timing of payments to local 
government  
• Reimburse private sector investor rather than pay up front 
• Use of “pay as you go” to allow TIF funds to accumulate prior to paying for redevelopment expenses 
 
Back TIF debt with other revenues: 
• Use of sales tax increments 
• Use of all property tax revenues collected in TAD 
• Expand size of TAD to encompass likely high growth areas 
• Regular reassessments to capture appreciation in property values 
(Note:  These policies may conflict with efforts to limit the tax base growth and thus fiscal capacity of a 
jurisdiction captured by TADs.) 
Risk of future tax policy changes Georgia State law provides that localities cannot change millage rates in a TAD while debt is still 
outstanding; however, State law changes and changes that affect the base assessed value can influence tax 
increments collected.   
 
• Monitor State laws to assess implications for TAD backed debt. 
• Prior to issuing TAD debt, localities should assess their future aspirations in terms of property tax 
policy (i.e., do they think cutting taxes is important economic development policy) 
Risk that TIF debt is not tax exempt Primarily a risk to bondholders, however the higher the risk the higher the interest rate on TIF debt (and 
thus the more expensive it may be). 
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• Initiating jurisdictions and their legal counsel need to carefully consider TIF debt and extent to which 
falls under rubric of “private activity bonds” 
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Current Tax Allocation Districts in Metropolitan Atlanta 
 
 
Eleven tax allocation districts have been created in metropolitan Atlanta to date.  Seven 
are located in Fulton County – five in the City of Atlanta, one in the City of East Point 
and one in unincorporated Fulton County.  Three are located in Cobb County – one each 
in the Cities of Acworth, Marietta and Smyrna.  One is located in unincorporated Clayton 
County.  These TADs, along with their respective net assessed values for tax year 2004, 







Westside TAD 1998 1 418,680,920$      610,200,440$      191,519,520$    73,300,000$        
Atlantic Steel TAD 1999 7,173,240            129,140,720        121,967,480      598,850,000        
Perry-Bolton TAD 2002 66,022,880          2 85,567,400          19,544,520        120,000,000        
Princeton Lakes TAD 2002 826,760               2 1,746,000            919,240             131,115,000        
Eastside TAD 2003 299,727,400        2 343,698,050        43,970,650        328,326,900        
   Subtotal 792,431,200        1,170,352,610     377,921,410      1,251,591,900     
City of East Point:
Camp Creek TAD 2001 4,720,280            25,316,280          20,596,000        92,400,000          
   Subtotal 4,720,280            25,316,280          20,596,000        92,400,000          
Unincorporated Fulton:
Sandy Springs TAD 2003 321,283,240        2 350,631,920        29,348,680        632,000,000        
   Subtotal 321,283,240        350,631,920        29,348,680        632,000,000        
Cobb County
City of Acworth:
Lakeside TAD 2003 1,017,348            3,384,438            2,367,090          18,480,552          
   Subtotal 1,017,348            3,384,438            2,367,090          18,480,552          
City of Marietta:
City Center South Renaissance TAD 2003 21,296,708          21,374,750          78,042               40,000,000          
   Subtotal 21,296,708          21,374,750          78,042               40,000,000          
City of Smyrna:
Atlanta Road Corridor TAD 2003 29,478,740          30,058,898          580,158             60,000,000          
   Subtotal 29,478,740          30,058,898          580,158             60,000,000          
Clayton County
Unincorporated Clayton:
Ellewood Town Center TAD 2003 16,116,068          3 na na 180,000,000        
   Subtotal 16,116,068          -                       -                     180,000,000        
   Grand Total 1,186,343,584$   1,601,118,896$   430,891,380$    2,274,472,452$   
Notes:
1  An expansion and redefination of the original Techwood Park TAD, created in 1992.
2  Submitted, but not yet certified by State Revenue Commissioner.
3  As per Redevelopment Plan.
Table 2















A brief description of each of these existing tax allocation districts, their redevelopment 
objectives and achievements to date, the policies that guided their creation, and the 
constraints placed upon them by their initiating and participating jurisdictions are 
provided in the following sections.   
 
 
City of Atlanta TADs 
 
The City of Atlanta has created five tax allocation districts pursuant to the 
Redevelopment Power Law:  the Westside TAD in 1998, the Atlantic Steel TAD in 1999, 
the Perry-Bolton TAD and the Princeton Lakes TAD in 2002 and the Eastside TAD in 
2003.  As indicated in Table 2 above, by tax year 2004, the combined assessed value of 
these five TADs amounted to nearly $1.17 billion – or approximately 6.84% of the City’s 
2004 net tax digest of $17.11 billion.  If redeveloped as planned, their combined assessed 
value would amount to over $2 billion – well over 10% of the City’s net assessed value.  
If and when this happens, the City will be unable, pursuant to the Redevelopment Powers 




The City of Atlanta created its first tax allocation district in 1992.  Encompassing the 
Techwood Park Urban Redevelopment Area, the City’s Tax Allocation Number One – 
Atlanta/Techwood Park (“Techwood Park TAD”) was established to bring about the 
redevelopment of that area immediately west of Atlanta’s central business district, 
generally between CNN Center and the Georgia World Congress Center (“GWCC”) and 
the Coca-Cola Company headquarters on North Avenue, and including the old Techwood 
Homes public housing project.  However, before the City’s plan gained any significant 
momentum, Atlanta was selected to host the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games.  Two 
years later it was announced that a large portion of the district would be purchased by the 
Georgia World Congress Authority (with funds provided by the Atlanta Committee for 
the Olympic Games) for the purpose of developing what is now Centennial Olympic 
Park.  As a majority of property within the TAD was thus converted from private to 
public ownership, assessed values within the district plummeted, creating, overall, a 
negative amount of incremental ad valorem taxes. 
 
The original redevelopment area was significantly expanded in July 1998 to include 
downtown’s Fairlie-Poplar District, the “railroad gulch” just east of CNN Center and 
Philips Arena (then under construction), an old commercial and warehouse distribution 
area south of the GWCC and Georgia Dome, an area around Hendon Homes and certain 
older commercial warehouse distribution areas north of and including GWCC and the 
Georgia Dome, and the English Avenue and Vine City residential neighborhoods.6  This 
expanded TAD Number One (at nearly 1,000 acres, the City’s largest) was renamed 
                                                 
6 The TAD was expanded again in October 1998 to include three parcels bounded on the west by Peachtree 
Street, on the north by Ellis Street, on the east by Peachtree Center Avenue and on the south by property 
owned by Georgia Pacific to facilitate the potential development of property just north and east of the 





Westside, and, effective December 31, 1998, its initial base assessed value (or “tax 
allocation increment base”) was adjusted to $418,680,920.  The City’s general goals for 
the Westside TAD were to capitalize on opportunities to revitalize land surrounding 
Centennial Olympic Park, foster the development and connections between the City’s 
CBD, Clark Atlanta University Center, Georgia Tech and adjoining neighborhoods by 
promoting improved transportation corridors, safer streets and pedestrian and greenway 
trails, and support efforts then underway to remove blighted conditions and expanding 
redevelopment efforts in the Vine City and English Avenue neighborhoods and certain 
fragmented commercial/warehouse districts located throughout the expanded district.  In 
essence, it was to induce the redevelopment of these latter areas within the TAD that 
constituted the “but for” test required by the Redevelopment Powers law.  To ensure an 
equitable distribution of benefits derived from the creation of the TAD, the City provided 
that 20% of the proceeds of any TAD bonds supported by valuations created in the 
“downtown area” of the TAD would go to fund projects in the Vine City and English 
Avenue neighborhoods, while 100% of the proceeds derived from valuations created 
within the Vine City and English Avenue neighborhoods (as well as certain other 
Empowerment Zone areas within the TAD) would go toward projects within such 
neighborhoods.  The Atlanta Development Authority (“ADA”) was designated by the 
City to act as it redevelopment agent for Westside,7 which is scheduled for termination as 
of December 31, 2023.  
 
According to Westside’s redevelopment plan, additional taxable development within the 
TAD was expected to produce $183,250,000 in incremental assessed values.  As of the 
end of 2004, that goal had been achieved, with the incremental assessed value of real 
property within the TAD at $191,519,520.  Since the plan’s preparation, additional 
projects have been announced for the area.  Construction of the Georgia Aquarium, 
though itself exempt from ad valorem taxation, will almost certainly spur additional 
development north of Centennial Olympic Park, as will the Coca-Cola Company’s 
planned relocation of the World of Coca-Cola Museum to an adjacent 22-acre parcel.  
Redevelopment of the historic Winecoff Hotel and Glenn Building into a luxury boutique 
hotels is being planned for the area, as are additional residential and mixed-use 
developments on Centennial Hill and commercial office space development on and 
around the site of the former Boomershine automobile dealership.   
 
In December 2001, the City issued $14,995,000 in TAD bonds to pay redevelopment 
costs within the district.  Projects receiving assistance from the bond issue were the 
Historic Westside Village development, the Museum Tower Condominium development, 
the Atlanta Centennial House Condominium development, the 123 Luckie Street 
residential development, the Northyard Business Park project and a portion ($1.5 million) 
of the cost of constructing Centennial Elementary School by the Atlanta Board of 
                                                 
7 ADA is an umbrella organization that encompasses three public agencies created by the City to provide 
community and economic development assistance – the Development Authority of the City of Atlanta, the 
Downtown Development Authority of the City of Atlanta and the Urban Residential Finance Authority – 






Education.8  One additional project that was slated for support – the Centennial Market 
project in Vine City – has not yet been implemented by ADA due to lack of market 
support.  Because the bonds were not issued until after a significant amount of 
incremental taxes had been generated, the City was able to obtain credit enhancement for 
them in the form of a bank letter of credit and was thus able to obtain an investment grade 
credit rating for the bonds of “A+” from Standard & Poor’s Corporation based on the 
LOC provider’s rating.  The City is currently planning a second TAD bond issue for the 
district of between $20 million and $40 million to fund further improvements in the area 
and support additional redevelopment within it. 
 
The Westside TAD has, by most measures, been a successful undertaking by the City.  
Both the amount and taxable value of redevelopment that have taken place within the 
district since its reincarnation as Westside in 1998 have been significant – exceeding in 
five years that which was originally projected.  It is even likely that the second issue of 
TAD bonds for the district could obtain investment grade credit ratings, based on 
preliminary indications from Moody’s Investors Service, even without credit 
enhancement from another creditworthy entity – a stunning achievement for a 
redevelopment district of its age. 
 
However, Westside’s successes have not been evenly spread throughout the TAD.  
Despite the City’s requirement that at least 20% of incremental taxes generated in the 
“downtown” section of the TAD (i.e., the area within the TAD lying east of Northside 
Drive) go toward inducing redevelopment activity in the “neighborhood” section of the 
TAD (i.e., the area west of Northside Drive), relatively little such activity has happened 
there.  In fact, virtually all of the completed projects have been located in the area 
immediately surrounding Centennial Olympic Park, with very little redevelopment 
activity thus far migrating to adjacent areas and very little of that activity resulting in 
affordable rental housing other than the Atlanta Housing Authority’s successful 
redevelopment of the old Techwood/Clark Howell public housing projects under the 
federal Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Hope VI grant program.  
While this uneven development trend may change over time, it currently presents a 
significant challenge to the City and ADA.  To the extent the “but for” test in connection 
with Westside had more to do with the difficulties of redeveloping such low and 
moderate income neighborhoods as Vine City and English Avenue, and not with the 
relative ease of creating new development around one of downtown’s newest and most 
significant public assets, Centennial Olympic Park, Westside has provided little more 
than public stimulus to redevelopment activities that, arguably, could have taken place 
anyway. 
 
From an administrative standpoint, Westside, as the City’s first TAD, has also 
experienced several potentially serious problems.  The tax allocation increment generated 
within Westside has come exclusively from increases in real property assessments, in part 
because the City’s resolution creating the TAD specified that only real property be used 
                                                 
8 In a separate agreement with the Board of Education, the City agreed to apply a minimum of $1.5 million 
from each TAD bond issue for Westside, together with 10% of the amount of TAD bonds issued in excess 
of $15 million, to reimburse it for the cost of constructing Centennial Elementary on the site of the old 





for computing the increment.  However, the Redevelopment Powers Law requires that 
both real and personal property be taken into account in that computation.  The failure by 
the Fulton County Tax Commissioner to abide by the terms of this higher legal authority, 
the sheer complexity of compliance, given the past and current difficulty in matching 
personal property tax returns with real estate parcel identification numbers, and the 
failure thus far of the City to insist that the problem be resolved, has reduced the amount 
of tax increments that otherwise would have been available to pay redevelopment costs 
and TAD bond debt service.   
 
Of greater significance was the inclusion by County tax officials in 1998 of exempt 
properties (e.g., properties owned by governmental entities, churches, schools and other 
exempt owners) in Westside’s tax allocation increment base (based assessed value) and in 
subsequent years’ assessed value figures.  The Redevelopment Powers Law requires that 
such amounts include only the “taxable values of taxable property” within the TAD.  
Thus, the implications of this error, though perhaps not immediately apparent, are 
substantial.  For instance, as of the current tax year (2004), the gross assessed value of 
property within Westside, as determined by County tax officials, is $610,200,440.  Over a 
third of this total, or $208,288,040 is represented by the assessed value of wholly exempt 
property.  Remember that the tax allocation increment is calculated by multiplying each 
year’s combined tax levies of the city, county and school board by a fraction, the 
numerator of which is the growth in assessed value since creation of the TAD and the 
denominator of which is the total assessed value of property within the TAD.   If both the 
tax allocation increment base of Westside and its 2004 gross assessed value had not 
included these exempt property assessments, and assuming for the moment that the total 
value of exempt property within the TAD has not changed since December 31, 1998, the 
district’s 2004 tax allocation increment would be as much as 50% higher than the $4.7 
million estimated for the current tax year, as shown in the following table. 
 


















W/ Exempt Prop. $418,680.920 $610,200,440 $191,519.520 31.4% $14,984,948 $4,703,176 
W/out Exempt Prop. 210,392,880 401,912,400 191,519,520 47.7% 14,984,948 7,140,636 
 
If Westside’s tax allocation increment base were re-certified so as to exclude exempt 
property, more tax increments could be made available to TAD projects and hasten the 
day that the TAD could be terminated and incremental taxes returned to the general funds 
of the City, Fulton County and Atlanta Board of Education. 
 
Atlantic Steel TAD 
 
The Atlantic Steel Brownfield Redevelopment Area and Tax Allocation District Number 
Two – Atlantic Steel (the “Atlantic Steel TAD”) was created by the City of Atlanta in 
September 1999, to be effective on December 31 of that year.  It is scheduled for 
termination as of December 31, 2024.  The TAD includes a 119-acre parcel upon which 
the former steel-making operations of Atlantic Steel Industries, Inc. were located for one 
hundred years and a 1.7-acre parcel that was formerly occupied by Tri-Chem 





“brownfields” and required extensive remediation under state and federal environmental 
laws prior to their planned redevelopment (along with another seven-acre parcel and five 
single-family residential parcels in the Home Park neighborhood within the TAD) into a 
mixed-use “mini-city” called Atlantic Station.  When completed, Atlantic Station will 
include, among other improvements, office towers, retail stores, entertainment facilities, 
restaurants, residential apartments and lofts, condominiums, single-family homes, hotels, 
public streets, plazas and parking facilities, pedestrian walkways and bike paths.  The 
remainder of the 138-acre TAD includes a 12-acre parcel owned by the Georgia Tech 
Foundation and used as a golf practice facility and other activities related to the Georgia 
Institute of Technology, whose long-range redevelopment into a technology office park is 
currently, and separately, planned by the Foundation. 
 
Remediation of the brownfield area within the TAD, which was completed in late 2001, 
consisted of four components:  (i) excavation and removal of contaminated soils from 
“potentially impact areas” within the TAD; (ii) installation of a ground water interception 
and monitoring system that will capture all ground water flowing from the basin in which 
the TAD is located, evaluate the ground water and, if needed, pre-treat it before it is 
discharged into the City’s sanitary sewer system; (iii) coverage of the entire brownfield 
site with either hard cover (e.g., parking decks, streets, sidewalks, roofs, etc.) or at least 
two feet of clean fill; and (iv) execution of a “conservation easement” to establish 
permanent restrictions upon the use of, and the permanent interception of all, ground 
water on or beneath the brownfield area, and ensuring that certain engineering and 
institutional controls relating to the brownfield sites are maintained in perpetuity. 
 
Unlike the Westside TAD and most of the other TADs created by the City of Atlanta, the 
Atlantic Steel TAD is a project-specific TAD.  General site remediation and 
infrastructure development (including the construction of a parking deck, providing over 
10,000 covered spaces beneath the planned office, retail and residential areas to the north 
of 17th Street and east of the proposed State Street extension) is being managed by 
Atlantic Station L.L.C. – a joint venture of local developer Jacoby Development, Inc. and 
AIG Global Real Estate Investment Corp., a wholly owned affiliate of American 
International Group, one of the world’s largest insurance companies (the “Developer”).  
The Developer acquired most of the property within the TAD from Atlantic Steel 
Industries, Inc. in December 1999, with the intent of dividing the site into 38 developable 
parcels to be developed by affiliates of the Developer and other entities (the “Vertical 
Developers”).  To date, the Developer has either sold or contracted for the sale of several 
such parcels with the following Vertical Developers (three of which are affiliated with 
the Developer): 
 
Section Developer Component Units/Sq.Ft. Status
Home Park North Beazer Homes, Inc. Low-rise Townhomes (fee) 94 Under Construction
The Commons Lane Investment and Development Corp. Mid-rise Residential (fee/rental) 1,150 Under Construction
The District (residential) Lane Investment and Development Corp. Main Podium Lofts (fee) 270 Under Construction
The District (residential) Novare Group Condomiums (fee)/Hotel 404/101 Under Construction
The District (retail) Atlantic District, L.L.C. Main Podium Retail/Entertainment 1,200,000 Under Construction
The District (office) Atlantic District, L.L.C. Main Podium Office 500,000 Completed
Tech Village (residential/rental) Lane IDC/Flagstone Holdings Residential (elderly/student) 216 Begin Construction 2005
Tech Village (retail) IKEA, Inc. Retail (home furnishings) 400,000 Under Construction
District North (retail) Target Stores Retail (general) 175,000 Begin Construction 2004
Table 4






Development of Atlantic Station was contingent upon the construction of a bridge across 
Interstates 75/85 (the “Downtown Connector”) at 17th Street by the Georgia Department 
of Transportation, in order to connect the relatively isolated site to the bulk of midtown 
Atlanta, and the extension of 17th Street through the TAD to Northside Drive.  
Construction of the bridge, which was funded primarily by federal highway grant funds, 
was completed in April 2004; and completion of the 17th Street extension, which was 
funded by the Developer, was completed in August 2004. 
 
The tax allocation increment base assessment for the Atlantic Steel TAD was initially set, 
and confirmed by the State Revenue Commissioner as being, $1,905,480.  However, it 
was later discovered that the ADA, in its initial submission to the State Revenue 
Department, had had omitted a number of the highest value parcels in the TAD 
(including the Atlantic Steel Industries site itself); and the assessment base was officially 
changed to $7,173,240 in 2001.  The Redevelopment Plan for the TAD projected total 
assessed value within the district to increase by nearly $592 million over the course of 
Atlantic Station’s development period.  As of tax year 2004, with all environmental 
remediation and most site and infrastructure development completed and significant 
vertical development on the assessment rolls, assessed values within the TAD had grown 
by over $126.5 million. 
 
The Redevelopment Plan calls for the City to reimburse the Developer its cost of 
remediating the brownfield sites, installing all public infrastructure and preparing 
properties within the TAD for vertical development from the net proceeds of tax 
allocation bonds issued over the initial ten-year development period.  All such horizontal 
development has bee completed, with well over $200 million in costs having been 
incurred.  In October 2001, the City issued its first series of tax allocation bonds for this 
purpose – sold on a non-rated basis in a limited offering to nine institutional investors.  
The total principal amount of bonds issued amounted to $76,505,000, of which about 
$46.2 million went toward covering these site development costs9, with another $19 
million contributed from City water and sewer funds.  The City is currently planning a 
second TAD bond offering, in an amount ranging from $50 and $100 million to 
reimburse an additional amount of these costs.   
 
The Atlantic Steel TAD, as one of the City’s early such districts, fell victim to some of 
the same administrative errors that beset Westside.  However, their effects are less 
significant and much easier to resolve.  For instance, exempt property also was included 
in Atlantic Steel’s base assessed value, but it constituted just the Georgia Tech 
Foundation property mentioned above, can easily be isolated and thus removed if County 
tax officials agree to do so.  Similarly, personal property values were not included in the 
base assessment and have not been included in subsequent AV calculations.  However, as 
a largely vacant brownfield in December 1999, there was no appreciable amount of 
                                                 
9 The remaining bond proceeds were used (i) to pay interest on the bonds until sufficient tax increments 
became available to do so ($10.8 million), (ii) to repay the City a $10 million loan used to separate the 
combined stormwater/sanitary sewer that ran through the site, (iii) to establish a debt service reserve fund 
equal to maximum annual debt service on the bonds ($7.6 million), and (iv) to pay the costs of issuing the 





personalty within the TAD and, until the SouthTrust office building was completed in 
April 2004, there has not been an appreciable amount of new such property to be 
included in the district’s assessed valuations. 
 
The Atlantic Steel TAD, and the Atlantic Station project for which it was created, have 
been very successful thus far in accomplishing their purpose and offer an excellent case 
study in the appropriate use of local tax incentives to stimulate private development that, 
without such incentives, could not or would not occur.  For decades, the cost of 
purchasing and remediating the Atlantic Steel site, as well as the cost of installing the 
public infrastructure almost totally lacking on the site and of connecting it to similarly 
developed parts of midtown Atlanta on the east side of the Downtown Connector, had 
prevented the private sector from seriously considering it, despite its central location and 
otherwise exceptionally good redevelopment potential.  The use by the City of tax base 
that otherwise would not have been created to incentivize that redevelopment could 
recapture a lost part of the City’s center, as well as expand considerably the tax base 




The Northwest Atlanta Redevelopment Area and Tax Allocation District Number Three – 
Perry/Bolton (the “Perry/Bolton TAD”) was the third such district created by the City of 
Atlanta, with an effective date of December 31, 2002.  Unlike the Westside and Atlantic 
Steel TADs, Perry/Bolton’s termination date, while estimated to be 25 years from its 
creation, will not occur until “all redevelopment costs have been paid” – including debt 
service on any TAD bonds issued to cover such costs, regardless when they may be 
issued.   
 
The district’s boundaries are quite serpentine (requiring a three-page description in the 
City’s Redevelopment Plan), but the TAD generally is bounded by Marietta Street on the 
north and east, Bolton Road on the north and west, and Bankhead Highway on the south.  
Perry Boulevard (named for Herman E. Perry, founder of Standard Life Insurance 
Company and Citizens Trust Bank) is the major thoroughfare within the district, 
generally running northwest to southeast, parallel and just south of Norfolk Southern 
Railroad’s Inman Yards and the CSX Railroad terminals, which, along with certain 
adjacent industrial land uses, are not included within the TAD.  For reasons that are not 
clear, Perry/Bolton’s redevelopment area is larger than the TAD itself.10
 
The goals of the TAD are to make general public infrastructure improvements within the 
district and throughout the larger redevelopment area that will attract private investment 
in mixed income, mixed-use residential developments and serve as a catalyst for 
additional private commercial and residential investments in Northwest Atlanta.  The 
animating force behind, and initial focus of the district’s redevelopment plan, as well as 
the likely recipient of initial City TAD bond proceeds, is the Atlanta Housing Authority’s 
planned redevelopment of the former Perry Homes and Perry Homes Annex public 
                                                 






housing projects into a 50-acre mixed-use development initially planned to consist of 
nearly 1,200 new homes, 46,000 square feet of commercial development, a 65,000 square 
foot YMCA, 18,000 square foot public library and 85,000 square foot elementary school 
in the central area of the development.  The plan also includes the conversion of the 
City’s old Gun Club landfill site into a 13-acre public golf course accessible to all 
residents in the development.  The plan asserts that implementation of this so-called 
“West Highlands” project, could not happen without the establishment of the TAD but, 
with it, could result in $340 million in private investment.  Public investment will be in 
the forms of revitalization and demolition grants received by the AHA under the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s HOPE VI program, federal and state 
transportation funds, and TAD bond proceeds.   
 
The resolution of the City creating the Perry/Bolton TAD and surrounding redevelopment 
area provides that all tax allocation increments created within the West Highlands master 
plan area shall be allocated first to West Highlands-related redevelopment costs.  All tax 
increments created within the Bolton/Marietta Street Livable Cities Initiative (“LCI”) 
planning area within the TAD shall be allocated to redevelopment costs within that area.  
And any tax increments in excess of those needed to pay redevelopment costs in these 
two areas shall be allocated to the area south of the CSX railroad tracks outside the West 
Highlands master plan area.   
 
While not yet certified by the State Commissioner of Revenue, the tax allocation 
increment assessment base for the Perry/Bolton TAD, as submitted by the City for 
certification, is $66,022,880.  Due primarily to property reassessments within the District, 
the value of taxable property within Perry/Bolton for tax year 2004 stands at 
$85,567,400, resulting in over $19.5 million in incremental assessed value.  
 
The Atlanta Board of Education’s resolution consenting to the inclusion of its portion of 
tax increments generated within the TAD was conditioned on the execution of an 
intergovernmental agreement with the City providing for certain “infrastructure 
improvements to schools” located in the TAD and certain “redevelopment cost 
payments” to the school district, the terms of which have yet to be negotiated.  Similarly, 
Fulton County’s consent to its financial participation in Perry/Bolton was conditioned on 
at least 40% of any new housing developed in the TAD be “affordable” to low and 
moderate income families – not the 20% level required in the City’s resolution creating 
the TAD – creating a conflict that has to be resolved before planned development may 
proceed. 
 
Updated plans for the West Highlands project have site development and remaining site 
acquisition commencing in 2004, with vertical construction commencing either in late 
2004 or early 2005.  Those plans call for approximately $22.3 million in net TAD bond 
proceeds – probably from two separate bond issues, given the expected pace of 
development. 
 
The Perry/Bolton TAD has not experienced at least one of the administrative errors that 
has adversely affected the Westside and Atlantic Steel TADs – the inclusion of exempt 





ADA and County tax officials.  However, the identification and incorporation of personal 
property tax values has been a challenge and will be until changes are made in the Board 
of Assessors systems that will allow, starting in tax year 2006, it to match personal 
property tax returns with real property valuations. 
 
Of perhaps greater significance, Perry/Bolton appears to have marked somewhat of a 
turning point in local public policy regarding tax allocation districts in at least four 
respects.  While essentially project-driven – in this case, the West Highlands project – 
Perry/Bolton continued the City’s trend, established initially in Westside, toward large 
TADs.  Moreover, by encompassing neighborhoods with significantly different 
redevelopment prospects, it tended to reinforce a corollary policy trend, established in 
Westside, toward providing public improvements to surrounding neighborhoods from tax 
increments generated elsewhere – if not for the stated purpose of stimulating private 
investment in those neighborhoods, then at least, while the City has access to county and 
school district taxes, to put those improvements in place. 
 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, Perry/Bolton marked the first time a City TAD 
was created primarily, if not specifically, to fund at least a portion of the costs of 
redeveloping a former public housing project.  With the future of federal HOPE VI 
funding in jeopardy, the use of tax allocation increments may sustain AHA’s heretofore 
successful public housing redevelopment efforts.  However, the controversy those efforts 
have generated, related to the displacement of former public housing tenants in favor of 
the establishment of “mixed income” communities in town, was reflected in the third 
important policy response – Fulton County’s requirement that a significantly higher 
amount of “affordable” housing be built within the TAD than that required by the City 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, creation of the Perry/Bolton TAD marked the first 
time participating jurisdictions in the City of Atlanta – both Fulton County, as mentioned 
above, and, significantly, the Atlanta Board of Education – balked at providing 
unconditional consent to the inclusion of its portion of any tax increments created within 
a TAD.11  Although the precise conditions placed on the School Board’s consent to 
Perry/Bolton have yet to be completely defined, its willingness to question the need for a 
TAD could spell (and in instances involving other metro Atlanta TADs has spelled) a 
dramatic public policy complication for an initiating jurisdiction. 
 
Princeton Lakes TAD 
 
The Princeton Lakes Redevelopment Area and Tax Allocation District Number Four – 
Princeton Lakes (the “Princeton Lakes TAD”) was the fourth district created by the City 
of Atlanta, effective, like Perry/Bolton, as of December 31, 2002.   Also like 
Perry/Bolton, Princeton Lakes’ scheduled termination date, while estimated to be in 
2027, will occur only when all redevelopment costs within the TAD have been paid.  The 
district encompasses approximately 475 acres of undeveloped land just west of the new 
Camp Creek Marketplace development (see summary of City of East Point’s Camp Creek 
                                                 
11 Although, as summarized in the discussion below regarding the City of East Point’s Camp Creek TAD, it 
was certainly not the first time a local board of education placed significant conditions on its financial 





TAD below) on the northwest corner of Camp Creek Parkway and Interstate 285 in 
southwest Atlanta.  The land had been held since the mid-1980s by owners who planned 
to develop a private golf club. 
 
The redevelopment plan for the Princeton Lakes TAD calls for the development of over 
1,000 single family homes, an approximate 500,000 square foot shopping center 
(essentially, an extension of Camp Creek Marketplace), 225 hotel rooms, five restaurants, 
two banks branch offices and an 8,000 square foot child care center.  The plan asserts 
that, but for the creation of the TAD, the costs of preparing the site for development, 
because of its challenging topography and the lack of any useable public infrastructure – 
e.g., streets, bridges (Camp Creek winds through the site), traffic control devices, sanitary 
or storm sewers, water supply or storm water detention facilities.  The TAD is a project-
specific district in which the site is controlled by one developer, the Bentley Group, Ltd, 
who, along with Pulte Homes and North American Properties, will provide all vertical 
development.  The estimated value of planned private investment within the TAD is 
approximately $366 million in consideration of approximately $26 million in public 
incentives, to be derived from TAD bond proceeds. 
 
The City resolution creating the Princeton Lakes TAD provided no special conditions, 
other than to use “excess” tax allocation increment to pay down any TAD bonds issued or 
other required redevelopment costs early; nor did the Fulton County resolution 
consenting to the inclusion of its portion of any incremental taxes generated within the 
TAD.  However, the Atlanta Board of Education has refused to give such consent with 
respect to its portion of tax increments created within the TAD, citing the need for such 
tax revenues to provide educational services to the new public school students expected 
to be generated by the large single-family housing development planned for the district.  
The Board also expressed doubt that planned development within the TAD required the 
level of public assistance requested in order to make it financially feasible.  This marked 
the first time a school district in metropolitan Atlanta refused to participate in a newly 
created tax allocation district.  Although the developers involved continue to pursue the 
various permits that will be necessary to allow the planned development to proceed, no 
ground has been broken as of the date of this report. 
 
The tax allocation increment base of the Princeton Lakes TAD, as submitted by the City 
for state certification, is $826,760.  Based on the redevelopment plan’s estimated value of 
new development within the TAD of $366 million, it is expected that approximately $131 
million in incremental assessed value will be created (net of homestead exemptions).  
With site preparation having begun in the TAD, the total assessed value for tax year 2004 




The fifth and newest tax allocation districted created by the City of Atlanta is the Eastside 
Atlanta Redevelopment Area and Tax Allocation District Number 5 – Eastside (the 
“Eastside TAD”).  The Eastside TAD’s creation was effective on December 31, 2003 and 
will terminate when any and all tax allocation bonds issued by the City for the district 





generally bounded by North Avenue, Piedmont Avenue and Freedom Parkway on the 
north, the Southern/CSX Railroad lines and Berean Avenue on the east, and Memorial 
Drive and Interstate 20 on the south.  Eastside’s western boundary generally includes 
Cooper Street, Forsyth Street, Peachtree Center Avenue, Baker Street, Courtland Street, 
Spring Street, Alexander Street and Williams Street.  Generally bisected by the 
Downtown Connector, it, together with the Westside TAD, covers virtually all of 
Atlanta’s Central Business District, along with certain blighted residential neighborhoods 
to the east and west of downtown. 
 
Planned redevelopment in Eastside is as spread out and as diverse as the neighborhoods 
within the TAD, although its general goals are to make public infrastructure 
improvements in the district that will precipitate private, tax-paying developments and 
thereby mitigate “conditions that have led to disinvestment, urban blight and marginal 
uses of property.”  The redevelopment plan projects an estimated $1.5 billion in private 
and public investment, comprising at least 18 projects that would add approximately 
6,200 new housing units, more than 400,000 square feet of retail space and 2.45 million 
square feet of new office space in and around downtown Atlanta.  Such projects, which 
are listed in Table 5 below, generally are centered either in the traditional downtown area 
west of I-20, in or around the historic Auburn Avenue Business District, or in or around 
the Atlanta Housing Authority’s Capitol Homes and Grady Homes public housing 
projects (including the Old Fourth Ward neighborhood and the areas surrounding the 
MLK MARTA station).   
 
Similar to City policy regarding Westside, the City resolution creating Eastside requires 
that at least 20% of the proceeds of any TAD bonds generated from tax increments 
created in the TAD will be set aside for improvements in those commercial and 
residential areas east of the Downtown Connector (the “non-downtown area”).  No 
conditions were placed by Fulton County consent to participate financial in the TAD, but 
the Atlanta Board of Education did condition its consent on its being paid 5.5% of the 
proceeds of all tax allocation bonds issued for the district, as well as an additional sum 
each year to the extent the Board is required by the State to levy more than the five mills 
otherwise required in order to receive State Quality Basic Education funding due to its 
inability to levy such taxes in the TAD.12
 
                                                 
12 The issue of whether this “QBE Make-Whole” payment will be required has not yet been resolved by the 





Downtown Projects Non-Downtown Projects
Peachtree Portal Condomiums Auburn-Butler Street Village Mixed-Use Project
SunTrust Plaza, Phase III Memorial Drive Corridor Redevelopment
RCG Mixed-Use Project Capitol Homes Redevelopment
Taylor Simpson Office Tower Grady Homes Redevelopment
SoNo Tower Wheat Street Gardens Project
GSU/Beaudry Ford Student Housing Project MLK Memorial MARTA Station Development
First Congregational Housing Development Historic Oakland Cemetery Redevelopment
Sheraton Atlanta Hotel Expansion
Downtown Health and Bioscience District
DeFoors Mixed-Use Project
South Company Headquarters Project
Table 5
Proposed Private and Public/Private Developments in the Eastside TAD
 
Although not yet certified by the Georgia State Revenue Commissioner, the tax 
allocation increment base that has been submitted for certification is $299,727,240.  (This 
figure excludes exempt property values in compliance with the Redevelopment Powers 
Law, and also excludes personal property values in contravention of it.)  The estimated 
$1.5 billion in improvements planned for the TAD are estimated to result in 
approximately $893 million in additional taxable value and, at stabilization, about $13.9 
million in annual tax allocation increment.  Eastside’s redevelopment plan calls for public 
investments of between $29 and $91 million within the TAD and, while it cites such 
other sources of such investments as federal and state planning and transportation funds 
and “other federal, state and local grant funding sources as appropriate and available,” it 
would appear to depend primarily on the proceeds of City TAD bonds for most these 
funds.  Under current market conditions, it is estimated that as much as $120 million 
could be generated from tax increments derived from private development planned within 
the TAD. 
 
In many ways, Eastside is the culmination of one set of evolving City policies regarding 
tax increment financing – the creation of large mega-TADs containing areas where blight 
and disinvestment have made private sector intervention difficult, combined with 
adjacent areas where private development interest is relatively keen.  Such TADs use 
incremental taxes generated largely in these latter areas to subsidize the cost of needed 
public improvements in the former areas in the hope that eventually such improvements 
will induce private interest there.  With termination dates set at such time as all 
redevelopment costs have been paid, but without specificity as to what those costs are or 
when they all will have been paid, such TADs potentially provide significant incremental 
taxes to provide public improvements and, hopefully, stimulate additional private 
investment.  If such TADs succeed in this latter objective, then they may be worthwhile 
and, in fact, be the only feasible way to effect desired redevelopment in such areas.  If 
they fail, however, they merely expose participating jurisdictions to the risk that their tax 
dollars will go toward subsidizing the cost of public improvements that otherwise would 
be the City’s responsibility alone, without generating any return on their investment other 
than that which they would have experienced without the TAD – and to do so for many, 





Princeton Lakes TAD, for that matter, where specific developments within well-defined 
areas are proposed to occur within relatively well-defined timeframes, such mega-TADs 
will require management attention and development savvy from the City and its 
redevelopment agent, ADA. 
 
City of East Point TAD 
 
The City of East Point was the second municipality within Fulton County to create a tax 
allocation district and, in the process of so doing, set a number of interesting precedents 
for subsequent initiating jurisdictions to consider. 
 
Camp Creek TAD 
 
The Camp Creek Redevelopment Area and Tax Allocation District Number One – Camp 
Creek (the “Camp Creek TAD”) was created by the City of East Point to be effective as 
of December 31, 2001.  It was the third tax allocation district created in metropolitan 
Atlanta and the first and, thus far, only TAD created in south Fulton County.  The City 
scheduled the Camp Creek TAD to terminate at such time as all redevelopment costs 
have been paid; however, by subsequent agreement with the Fulton County Board of 
Education, it will terminate not later than December 31, 2026.  The district includes 831 
acres of previously undeveloped land located at the southeast and northwest corners of 
the intersection of Camp Creek Parkway and Interstate 285 in southwest Fulton County. 
 
Camp Creek is a project-specific TAD.  Planned development includes the Camp Creek 
Trade Center, 4 million square feet of planned office and distribution/warehouse space to 
be developed south of Camp Creek Parkway (and west of I-285) by Duke Realty 
Corporation, one of the largest real estate companies in the country, and Camp Creek 
Market Place, a 650,000 square foot open-air shopping center (so-called “power center”) 
that has been developed to the north of Camp Creek Parkway by North American 
Properties, a privately held shopping center developer based in Atlanta.  Private 
investment within the TAD is estimated at $185 million, but will require a public 
investment (from TAD bond proceeds) of approximately $20 million in order to install 
public infrastructure on the two development sites (e.g., new roads and bridges, 
intersection improvements, water and wastewater facilities, etc.) needed to allow the 
developments to occur.  (As mention above, the North American Properties development 
site within the TAD is adjacent to and just east of the City of Atlanta’s Princeton Lakes 
TAD.)  Camp Creek’s tax allocation increment base was certified at $4,720,280 as of 
December 31, 2001, and as of tax year 2004, assessed value within the TAD stands at 
$25,316,280.  Neither figure includes personal property.   
 
The City of East Point issued $22,00,000 in tax allocation bonds for the TAD in May 
2002, which, net of $3.68 million in capitalized interest and $510,000 in issuance 
expenses, provided approximately $17.81 million toward infrastructure costs.  Since 
Duke Realty’s development schedule was to be based exclusively on market demand, 
reasonably accurate projections of the amount and timing of tax allocation increments 






The resolution creating the TAD contained no particularly special conditions, nor did 
Fulton County’s consent resolution.  However, the Fulton County Board of Education 
imposed three significant conditions to its consent to participate financially in the TAD, 
some of which have been embraced by other school boards facing similar circumstances 
within their jurisdictions.  Initially, the School Board maintained, on the advice of legal 
counsel, that any participation by it in funding redevelopment costs within the TAD 
would violate with the “educational purposes” clause of the Georgia Constitution.  As 
discussed above, that clause, contained in Article VIII, Section VI, Paragraph I (b), 
provides that “school tax funds” shall be expended only for public education purposes; 
and the Fulton County School Board could see no such purposes being served by the 
development of a business/industrial park and adjacent shopping center.  However, based 
on an opinion from the state’s Attorney General, the Board ultimately agreed to 
participate on the condition that a long-term intergovernmental contract be executed 
between the Board and the City providing, among other things, the following: 
 
1. that no TAD bonds, over and above the initial $22 million, would be issued by 
the City (excepting only bonds issued to refinance that initial issue); 
2. that such TAD bonds would mature, and the TAD itself would terminate, not 
later than December 31, 2026; and 
3. that any tax allocation increment in excess of TAD bond debt service in any 
year be used by the City as follows: 
 
(a) 45.3% of any such excess would be reimbursed to the Board to 
compensate it for taxes foregone (as mentioned earlier, an allowable 
“redevelopment cost” under the Redevelopment Powers Law); and 
(b) the remaining 54.7% would be used by the City to redeem TAD bonds 
prior to their maturity. 
 
The Camp Creek TAD was significant, from a policy standpoint, for at least two reasons.  
Most significantly, it was the first time a local school board objected to, and ultimately 
placed significant conditions on its financial participation in, a tax allocation district.  
These conditions included the concepts of capping the assistance to be provided TAD 
development projects, of sharing excess tax increments with a participating jurisdiction 
prior to a TAD’s termination, and of requiring that a TAD be terminated within a pre-
established, precise, not-to-exceed period of time.  As is discussed above, and more fully 
below, it was not to be the last time participating jurisdictions in metro Atlanta have 
asserted themselves in the exercise of local redevelopment powers.   
Additionally, by placing TAD bonds with that development entity most knowledgeable 
about and responsible for the creation of sufficient incremental taxes to meet TAD bond 
debt service requirements, when due, Camp Creek created a template that, in similar 












In additional to participating financially in six tax allocation districts created by the cities 
of Atlanta and East Point, Fulton County created its own TAD in the unincorporated area 
of Sandy Springs in north Fulton County.   
 
Sandy Springs TAD 
 
Effective as of December 31, 2003, the Sandy Springs Redevelopment Area and Tax 
Allocation District Number One – Fulton County/Sandy Springs (the “Sandy Springs 
TAD”) was created by the Fulton County Commission to address the grinding traffic 
congestion and deteriorating business district along, as well as the deleterious effects 
such conditions have had on neighborhoods on either side of, Roswell Road from the 
Atlanta City limits on the south to just north of Dalrymple road on the north.  At 
approximately 1,200 acres, it is the largest tax allocation district yet created in 
metropolitan Atlanta.  By agreement with the Fulton County Board of Education, the 
TAD will terminate on or before December 31, 2028. 
 
Sandy Springs’ redevelopment plan calls for several projects whose primary goals are to 
overcome historic deficiencies in public investment within the TAD, which have served 
to divert private development to the Central Perimeter area between and along the newer 
north-south corridors of Ashford-Dunwoody Road and Georgia Highway 400 north of 
Interstate 285, and to stimulate private investment within Sandy Springs as a result.  Such 
projects fall into one or more of five general categories: 
 
• Circulation system improvements, including vehicular, pedestrian and transit 
• Public spaces 
• Public facilities 
• Public-private partnerships 
• Land assemblage 
 
Selective street segment extensions to remove vehicular traffic from congested Roswell 
Road, pedestrian streetscape improvements, a Sandy Springs shuttle, the development of 
parks, open space and public parking in the historic heart of Sandy Springs, and a land 
assemblage revolving fund to help overcome redevelopment barriers caused by multiple 
small property owners are expected to require approximately $23.5 million in TAD bond 
proceeds and approximately $43.3 million in state and federal transportation funds and 
foundation grants.  The plan projects that, with such public investments, nearly $270 
million in direct private investments in four new mixed-use developments, and as much 
as another $500 million in new investment and natural appreciation in property values on 
adjacent parcels and in the numerous neighborhoods along the Roswell Road corridor. 
 
The tax allocation increment base assessment within the district, as submitted by the City 
for state certification, is $321,283,240, excluding personal property, but is still awaiting 
certification by the State Revenue Commissioner.  That assessment base is projected to 
more than double, with the creation of approximately $317.7 million in additional 





year 2004, total assessed values have increased over $29 million, due largely to property 
reassessments, to $350,631,920. 
 
Fulton County imposed no special conditions on the TAD in creating it, although the 
County Board of Education, following the precedent it established in connection with the 
Camp Creek TAD, did.  As with Camp Creek, school board consent to the inclusion of its 
portion of any tax increments created within the Sandy Springs TAD was conditioned on 
three general conditions: 
 
4. that TAD bonds would be limited in amount to $24 million or less (excepting 
only additional TAD bonds issued to refinance outstanding bonds); 
5. that such TAD bonds would mature, and the TAD itself would terminate, not 
later than 25 years from the their date of issuance; and 
6. that any tax allocation increment in excess of TAD bond debt service in any 
year be used by the City as follows: 
 
(a) 52.1% of any such excess would be reimbursed to the Board to 
compensate it for taxes foregone (as mentioned earlier, an allowable 
“redevelopment costs” under the Law); and 
(b) the remaining 47.9% would be used by the City to redeem TAD bonds 
prior to their maturity. 
 
However, in addition to these conditions, the school board provided that its portion of tax 
increments could be spent only on redevelopment costs associated with specific projects, 
and that those projects had to have received prior approval of the board.  It also required 
that the TAD be terminated if TAD bonds had not been issued for such specific projects 
by December 31, 2008.  
 
 
Tax Allocation Districts in Cobb County 
 
Cobb County, along with three of its incorporated municipalities, Acworth, Marietta and 
Smyrna, received voter approval in November 2002 of a local act allowing them to 
operate under the Redevelopment Powers Law.  All three of the municipalities created 
tax allocation districts in 2003.  Although Cobb County itself has not yet created any 
TADs, it did develop the first written set of public policies and guidelines in early 2003 
that, along with refinements generated later by the Cobb County Board of Education, 
guided its decision-making concerning the three municipal TADs seeking its financial 
participation.  In the process, public policies regarding the creation and support of TADs, 




The City of Acworth created the Lakeside Redevelopment Area and Tax Allocation 
District Number One – Lakeside (the “Lakeside TAD”) to be effective as of December 
31, 2003.  A project-specific TAD, Lakeside’s sole purpose was to redevelopment a 40-





(“C&D”) landfill and flea market on U.S. 41 Highway just inside Cobb County at the 
Paulding County line.  Working with North American Properties (also involved in 
Atlanta’s Princeton Lakes TAD and East Point’s Camp Creek TAD), the City sought to 
develop a 370,000 square foot retail “power center,” anchored by a Target Superstore, on 
the site, remove a blighting influence in this otherwise developing corridor, and capitalize 
on a large and rapidly growing customer base in Paulding County. 
 
At an estimated value of $46.2 million, the proposed development is projected to add 
over $17.5 million in assessed value to Lakeside’s tax allocation increment base (as of 
the end of 2003) of $1,017,348 (which includes personal property values).  With Cobb 
County and County Schools financial participation, it is estimated that this incremental 
assessed value will support as much as $7.5 million in City TAD bonds, the net proceeds 
of which would go toward covering North American Properties’ cost of site preparation.  
Due to the site’s use for years as a C&D landfill, foundation pilings had to be set, in some 
areas, as deep as 95 feet to support the vertical construction planned for the site.  The 
additional costs of preparing such a site for redevelopment, including the collection and 
release of methane gases that had built up over the years, served as the primary 
justification for providing TAD bond assistance to the project. 
 
Virtually all other terms and conditions related to the administration of the TAD were 
dictated by an intergovernmental agreement with Cobb County and the Cobb County 
Board of Education pursuant to which the County and the School District consented to 
the inclusion of their respective portions of any tax increments generated in the TAD to 
pay TAD redevelopment costs.  That agreement required the City to comply with the 
following conditions: 
 
1. That any and all TAD bonds issued would not in the aggregate exceed $7.5 
million;  
2. That any such TAD bonds shall mature, and the TAD shall be in existence, 
not later than December 31, 2030;  
3. That if all or a portion of such TAD bonds have not been issued by December 
31, 2006, the County and School Board’s consent would terminate; 
4. Though personal property tax increments would go toward securing the TAD 
bonds, that any and all such bonds be sized based solely on the real property 
tax increments projected for the TAD; and 
5. That all tax increments generated in excess of TAD Bond debt service and 
certain other “contractually committed expenditures” be paid over to the 




City Center South Renaissance TAD 
 
The City of Marietta created the City Center South Renaissance Redevelopment Area and 
Tax Allocation District Number One (the “CCSR TAD”) effective as of December 31, 
2003.  The 270-acre TAD is centered on, and includes the neighborhoods surrounding, 





south of the downtown Marietta square (including, oddly enough, the Confederate 
Cemetery on Powder Springs Road).   It also includes the Marietta Golf Course and 
Conference Center to the immediate southwest of these neighborhoods.  The TAD is 
described as a project-specific effort, focusing on the redevelopment of one former public 
housing site (Johnny Walker Homes) and one current public housing site (Clay Homes) 
into mixed-use residential and convenience retail developments.  (Some of the express 
purposes of the redevelopment plan are to increase home ownership and family incomes 
and decrease crime, unemployment and poverty within the TAD.)  However, future 
projects within the TAD are anticipated in the redevelopment plan.  (While it is a 
standing question as to why the City-owned, and thus tax-exempt, Marietta Golf Course 
and Conference Center was included within the TAD, it would appear at this point that 
the TAD was drawn broadly – like Atlanta’s Eastside and Westside TADs – so as to 
collect enough tax increments to subsidize these relatively high-risk undertakings. 
 
The tax allocation increment base of the CCSR TAD is estimated in the redevelopment 
plan at $21,296,708, and it is projected that the Johnny Walker Homes redevelopment 
would generate between $8 million and $19 million in incremental assessed value, 
depending upon the density level of its development.  This is estimated to support 
between $3 million and $5.9 million in City tax allocation bonds and, although the City 
initially insisted that it had no plans to issue any such bonds, Marietta insisted on keeping 
the option of issuing up to $20 million in TAD bonds over the life of the TAD. 
 
Cobb County insisted on essentially the same conditions that it imposed on Acworth’s 
Lakeside TAD in consenting to the inclusion of its portion of incremental taxes generated 
to pay TAD redevelopment costs.  The Marietta City School Board imposed no such 
conditions on its financial participation in the TAD. 
 
Marietta currently is seeking County and City School Board consent to participate in a 
significantly expanded CCSR TAD, to include residential neighborhoods to the west and 
south and may be seeking the creation of a new TAD on either side of Interstate 75 at 
Hwy, 120S.  The City appears to be expanding TADs to certain areas less for the prospect 
of additional increment-producing development than for the opportunity to use eminent 
domain powers to replace deteriorated rental housing complexes with owner-occupied 
housing and complementary commercial development. 
 
Atlanta Road TAD 
 
The City of Smyrna created the Atlanta Road Corridor Redevelopment Area and Tax 
Allocation District Number One (the “Atlanta Road TAD”) effective December 31, 2003.  
This 140-acre TAD is centered on Atlanta Road from Windy Hill Road on the north to 
Spring Road on the south.  It includes the Belmont Hills Shopping Center on the north 
side of the TAD, Jonquil Plaza shopping center on the south side and the newly 
redeveloped Smyrna city government complex and adjacent Market Village (“City 
Center”) in the center of the TAD.  The overall goal of the Atlanta Road TAD is fairly 
general: to encourage private investment in Smyrna’s northern sector by offering 





disinvestment and marginal use of property.  The projects planned for the TAD, however, 
are somewhat more specific: 
 
1. Redevelopment of the Belmont Hills Shopping Center; 
2. Redevelopment of the apartment communities immediately adjacent to the 
Belmont Hills Shopping Center; 
3. Development of a condominium project near City Center; 
4. Redevelopment of retail and office space between the Atlanta Road/Spring 
Road intersection and Market Village; and 
5. Mixed-use redevelopment, including retail and residential, of the existing 
Jonquil Plaza shopping center. 
 
As of the date of the TAD’s creation, however, the City had not obtained commitments 
from the owners of the properties to be redeveloped, other than the City itself for the 
condominium project mentioned above.  Thus, while planned projects are estimated to 
add over $70 million in net assessed values to the TAD’s tax allocation increment base of 
$29,478,740 – values that would support nearly $23 million in City TAD bonds – the 
City has not yet developed specific plans for the use of bond proceeds. 
 
In reviewing the Atlanta Road TAD, both Cobb County and the County Board of 
Education were uncomfortable with the apparent lack of any ready-to-go projects, other 
than the further enhancement of City Center, or specific plans for the use of TAD bond 
proceeds.  Thus, while both governments agreed to participate financially, they did so 
under essentially the same conditions as those imposed on the Acworth and Marietta 
TADs, plus the condition that specific projects, if, as and when developed by the City, 
would have to receive their prior approval.  After the fact, County and School Board 
discomfiture with the Smyrna plan occasioned a change in their policies regarding tax 
allocation districts expressing a strong preference for project-specific TADs and 




Unincorporated Clayton County 
 
The Clayton County Commission also went into the tax increment financing business in 
2003, but did so in a way different from other metro Atlanta governments – a way more 
of them may have to emulate in the future – the “go-it-alone” TAD. 
 
 
Ellenwood Town Center TAD 
 
Clayton County created the Ellenwood Town Center Redevelopment Area and Tax 
Allocation District Number One – Ellenwood Town Center (the “Ellenwood Town 
Center TAD”) effective December 31, 2003 and terminating once all redevelopment 





TAD, created to induce the development, by Ellenwood Partners LLC13, of a new mixed-
use community on approximately 400 acres at the intersection of Interstate 675 and Anvil 
Block Road, just south of I-285 in unincorporated Clayton County.  This Ellenwood 
Town Center will contain more than 1.4 million square feet of specialty retail shops and 
stores, restaurants and entertainment facilities, three hotels, professional and medical 
office space and mini-storage facilities.  This “lifestyle center” will be developed on 
approximately 270 acres of largely undeveloped land along Anvil Block Road and will 
serve the Villages of Ellenwood, which will include over 1,000 new homes, townhomes, 
condominiums and apartments, to be developed in conjunction with the Town Center – as 
well as the more than 12,000 new homes currently planned, zoned or under construction 
within a five-mile radius, more than half of which are outside Clayton County. 
 
Justification for the TAD, and the reason given in the TAD’s redevelopment plan for the 
property not having been heretofore developed, is the site’s challenging topography, 
characterized by extensive rock deposits, and the resulting lack of sanitary and storm 
sewer and water supply infrastructure needed to connect with existing public systems.  
The cost of overcoming these challenges, and of installing “an integrated system of 
sidewalks, trails, streets, landscaping, parks and a town center”, is estimated in the plan at 
$29.5 million – to be derived from County TAD bond proceeds.  Such bonds are to be 
supported by the estimated $248 million in additional private investment associated with 
the project that is contemplated, which is estimated to contribute approximately $99 
million in assessed values over and above the TAD’s estimated tax allocation increment 
base of $16.1 million. 
 
In order to support the $25-30 million in TAD bonds required to support the project, 
however, the County would need more than the incremental taxes derived by it from 
these incremental values.  Rather than request that the Clayton County Board of 
Education participate financially in the TAD, the County chose to earmark the estimated 
$1.37 million in incremental local option sales taxes that it would derive as a result of the 
Town Center retail development – contingent on an amendment to the Redevelopment 
Powers Law allowing the direct pledge of such tax revenues.  As mentioned above, that 
amendment was enacted this year by the Georgia General Assembly.  Thus, the 
Ellenwood Town Center TAD became the first tax allocation district in metro Atlanta 
supported solely by the initiating jurisdiction and supported by both incremental ad 




                                                 
13 Ellenwood Partners LLC is comprised of Liberty Development Corporation, an Atlanta-based residential 













RESEARCH ATLANTA, INC. 
 
Research Atlanta, Inc. is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit organization 





• To develop and present reliable information about community issues to Atlanta 
area leaders in a manner that encourages informed policy planning and 
implementation. 
 
• To present information on community issues to the general public so that it can 
better understand and participate in decisions affecting the community. 
 
 
Research has been conducted in such areas as public education, taxation, 
government structure, private philanthropy, housing, delivery of government 





THE ANDREW YOUNG SCHOOL OF POLICY STUDIES 
 
The Andrew Young School of Policy Studies was established at 
Georgia State University in 1996 in an effort to train tomorrow's 
leaders in the public, non-profit, and private sectors, as well as 
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